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Clawbacks: Prospective Contract
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive
Compensation and Ponzi Schemes
Miriam A. Cherryt and Jarrod Wongtt
INTRODUCTION
Months after insurance giant American International
Group (AIG) faltered and the federal government provided fi-
nancial assistance to keep the company afloat,' executive com-
pensation and bonus practices at the company came under
scrutiny.2 Taxpayers balked when evidence came to light that
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tlett, Gerald Caplan, Susan D. Franck, Emily Garcia Uhrig, Franklin A. Ge-
vurtz, Matthew Hall, Michael Malloy, Thomas Main, Angela Onwauchi-Willig,
Shruti Rana, Robert L. Rogers, Keith Rowley, Irma Russell, Chaim Saiman,
William Sjostrom, John Sprankling, and Kojo Yelpaala for their comments and
insights. Additional thanks to James Wirrell and Paul Howard for their excel-
lent library assistance, Harriet Anderson, Brooke Tomlinson, and Adam Ro-
senberg for their research assistance, and the editors of the Minnesota Law
Review for their help with the publication process. Copyright C 2009 by Mi-
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1. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 14-29), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractlid=1346552 (describing the circumstances sur-
rounding AIG's near-bankruptcy and the subsequent bailout). Various sources
have been tracking the recipients of government bailout money. See, e.g., Mat-
thew Ericson et al., Tracking the $700 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2009, http://projects.nytimes.com/creditcrisis/recipients/table; ProPublica, Eye
on the Bailout, http:/Ibailout.propublica.org/main/list/index (last visited Nov.
8, 2009).
2. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, Uproar Over Geithner's Role in Bonuses
Could Vex Rescue, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A5 (reporting that AIG paid
out $165 million in bonuses after the company received bailout funds).
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large bonuses were being paid to executives-the same execu-
tives, in certain instances, who had been responsible for AIG's
losses. 3 The disconnect between AIG's huge losses and the mul-
ti-million dollar bonus payments is a striking example of "pay
without performance," a phenomenon that Professors Jesse
Fried and Lucian Bebchuk documented in their book of the
same name.4 Responding to public outrage,5 the House of Rep-
resentatives sought to impose a retroactive marginal taxation
rate of ninety percent on the AIG bonuses (as of the date of this
writing, the bonus tax had passed in the House of Representa-
tives, but not the Senate).6 During the debate over the bonus
3. See Randall Smith & Liam Pleven, Some Will Pay Back AIG Bonuses,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at Al (reporting that certain members of AIG's
Financial Products group-responsible for a great deal of the losses-had re-
ceived bonuses, but that some, under mounting public pressure, had decided to
repay them).
4. LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 15-41 (2004) (sug-
gesting that in the absence of arm's-length bargaining between directors and
executives, executive performance and compensation have become unlinked).
5. See, e.g., John Christoffersen, AIG Execs' Lavish Homes Draw Busload
of Activists, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at A4 (discussing middle-class pro-
testors who visited executives' homes in hopes of convincing them to share
their wealth); Michael M. Phillips, Outrage Overflows on Capitol Hill as Law-
makers Denounce Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A4 ("Members of the
House . . . mentioned their outrage at . . . [AIG] 18 times . . . . And that was
during 45 minutes of opening remarks, even before the immediate target of
their outrage, AIG Chief Executive Edward M. Liddy, entered the room.");
Liam Pleven et al., AIG Faces Growing Wrath over Payouts, WALL ST. J., Mar.
16, 2009, at Al ("Troubled insurer American International Group Inc., now
[eighty percent] owned by U.S. taxpayers, spent the weekend deflecting
mounting criticism of how government funds have been . . . used to pay em-
ployee bonuses at the business unit that almost sank the company."); Jona-
than Weisman et al., Treasury Will Make Grab to Recoup Bonus Funds, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, at Al (quoting Republican Senator Charles Grassley as
saying that AIG's managers should "take that deep bow and say 'I'm sorry' and
then either do one of two things: resign or go commit suicide.").
6. See To Impose an Additional Tax on Bonuses Received from Certain
TARP Recipients, H.R. 1586, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Greg Hitt & Aaron
Lucchetti, House Passes Bonus Tax Bill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2009, at Al (de-
scribing the House bill as an echo of "popular outrage over big payouts to em-
ployees of [AIG]"). As of the time of this writing, the bonus tax is still being
considered, but no action has been taken in the Senate. See infra Part I.B.2.
The legality of such a tax is questionable, not only because of its retroactive
nature, but also because targeting specific companies and individuals creates
potential constitutional issues, including bill of attainder concerns. Although
the constitutional issues are interesting in their own right (and the later por-
tion of the Article attempts some preliminary analysis}-they are not our main
focus. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. Instead, we are more con-
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tax, both legislators and media alike described the pending bill
as a "clawback" provision.7
The same term-"clawback"-has been used to refer to re-
medies potentially available to defrauded investors in a Ponzi
scheme.8 For over a decade, the former director of NASDAQ,
Bernard Madoff, had been pretending to operate a hedge fund
that turned out to be one immense house of cards.9 The fraud
robbed investors, including some charitable institutions, of bil-
lions of dollars10 and created a crisis of confidence in the capital
markets." In Madoff's fund, there was in reality no investment
strategy to provide "hedges" against typical forms of risk. In-
deed, there did not even appear to have been any trading of
stock for over a decade. 12 Rather, as in a textbook Ponzi
scheme, the early investors were bought off with the money
cerned with writing clawback provisions into contracts prospectively and ex-
amining the consequences of their inclusion on contract law.
7. See, e.g., Michael O'Neal, AIG Tumult Eroding Confidence, CHI. TRIB.,
June 11, 2009, at Al5 ("The bill seeks to claw back bonuses . . . ."). In the in-
tervening months, other developments, including the appointment of Kenneth
Feinberg as Special Master or "Compensation Czar" for TARP recipients, and
the focus on passing a "Say on Pay" shareholder vote have taken more central
places in the government's policy toward executive compensation. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for
Compensation and Corporate Governance (June 10, 2009), http://www.treas
.gov/press/releases/tgl65.htm [hereinafter TARP Standards Press Release]
(announcing the new Treasury Department rules capping CEO pay for compa-
nies receiving TARP funds); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Statement
by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner on Compensation (June 10, 2009), http://
www.treas.gov/press/releases/tgl63.htm [hereinafter Geithner Statement
Press Release] (laying out the principles underlying the Treasury Depart-
ment's compensation restrictions); see also Louise Story & Stephen Labaton,
Overseer of Big Pay Is Seasoned Arbitrator, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at B1
(describing the "almost unprecedented discretion" of the Compensation Czar to
set compensation levels). For a further discussion of current developments, see
infra Part I.B.1.
8. See, e.g., Jane J. Kim, As 'Clawback' Suits Loom, Some Investors Seek
Cover, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2009, at C3 ("Investors who lost money with fin-
ancier Bernard Madoff are girding for potential 'clawback' suits that might be
brought by the trustee in charge of liquidating Mr. Madoff's firm.").
9. Some estimates place investor losses at nearly $65 billion. See Aaron
Lucchetti & Tom Lauricella, Investors Were Told They Had a Total of $64.8
Billion, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at A2.
10. See id.
11. See, e.g., Robert Frank et al., Madoff Jailed After Admitting Epic
Scam, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009, at Al ("Mr. Madoff's decline and fall added
to a national crisis of confidence and distrust of the financial system.").
12. See, e.g., Amir Efrati & Robert Frank, Madoff Set to Plead Guilty to 11
Felonies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at Al ("A court-appointed trustee has
found that no trading occurred for more than a decade.").
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from the later investors. 13 In turn, the payouts to the early in-
vestors were relied upon as proof of profitability to convince
later investors that returns were legitimate. Because Madoff
and his "hedge fund" are now insolvent, the question has arisen
as to whether the bankruptcy trustee may bring a "clawback"
action on behalf of the later investors to recover the profits of
the early investors.14
In recent months, Congress, the media, and other commen-
tators have all employed the term "clawback" to describe a
stunningly broad variety of contractual provisions, legislative
enactments, and legal remedies.15 This leads to a series of ques-
tions surrounding so-called clawback provisions. First, what
constitutes a "clawback"?e Are the provisions in the bailout
law dealing with AIG or the remedies in Ponzi schemes "claw-
backs," or something else entirely? Why are the current reme-
dies in these contexts inadequate? 7 Why are these retroactive
remedies so difficult to implement under current law? Going
forward, how might prospective inclusion of clawback provi-
sions and a robust interpretation of those provisions be desira-
ble? What effect would clawback provisions have on other mat-
ters of well-settled contract doctrine that deal with allocation of
risk?' 8 This Article aims to provide a framework for answering
these questions, while using current situations at the forefront
of the current financial crisis as salient examples. Specifically,
we discuss executive compensation, as highlighted in the cases
of AIG and Merrill Lynch, and Ponzi schemes, as illustrated by
the multi-billion dollar fraud in the Madoff hedge fund, both of
which involve the controversial effort to impose clawbacks re-
troactively.
In this Article, we explore and develop the doctrine of
clawbacks. We define "clawback" as a theory for recovering
benefits that have been conferred under a claim of right, but
that are nonetheless recoverable because unfairness would oth-
13. See, e.g., Tom Lauricella et al., Madoff Used U.K Office in Cash Ploy,
Filing Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2009, at Cl (describing criminal charges
against Madoff).
14. See Kim, supra note 8.
15. See, e.g., supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
205, 207-08.
16. The term "clawback" has been used in a somewhat casual way to de-
scribe any effort at recoupment of losses. In Part III of the Article we discuss a
more precise definition of the term in greater detail. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra Part III.C.
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erwise result. This definition includes both retroactive claw-
backs-those that, like the (pending) ninety percent tax on bo-
nuses, are imposed after the contractual right to the bonuses
has arisen and the benefits have been conferred-and prospec-
tive clawbacks that are introduced into contracts before the
claim of right to the benefits has arisen. For example, some
companies, like Dell, are prospectively writing provisions into
their executive compensation contracts that would recover or
cancel bonus awards in the event that the company must re-
state its financial results.19
As we will explain further, the structure of clawbacks indi-
cates that they operate more effectively if they are prospective,
rather than retroactive. Accordingly, we suggest writing pros-
pective clawback terms into contracts directly, or implying
them through default rules where possible, for example
through potential amendments to the law of securities regula-
tion.
The Article begins, in Part I, with a discussion of clawback
provisions in executive compensation contracts. Part II moves
to examine clawback clauses in the context of Ponzi schemes,
primarily through a study of the Madoff hedge fund fraud.
Next, Part III draws these strands together by discussing the
definition of clawbacks, as well as the doctrinal implications of
clawback clauses within the panoply of contractual remedies.
Ultimately, we make the argument that clawback clauses will
be an effective measure to avoid some of the predicaments in
which shareholders and investors are currently embroiled.
I. CLAWBACK PROVISIONS AND EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
Excessive executive compensation in United States compa-
nies has long been a problematic corporate governance issue,20
and one that despite many reform proposals has been seeming-
ly resistant to change. 21 From an international perspective, the
19. See infra Appendix, Part C.
20. Much of the case law on everything from fiduciary duty to shareholder
voting has arisen out of disputes over executive compensation. See, e.g., Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 552-57 (1949) (affirming the
applicability of New Jersey shareholder litigation law over a shareholder dis-
pute regarding managerial compensation); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 47-51, 68-73 (Del. 2006) (holding that a $130 million se-
verance package did not violate the board's or the president's fiduciary duty to
shareholders).
21. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that the gap between
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United States has a larger discrepancy between the amount
paid to top executives and the average worker than many coun-
tries in Europe. 22 While there has been much concern about the
problem of excessive executive compensation-from both corpo-
rate governance and social equality perspectiveS23-and there
has been much discussion about potential solutions, 24 the prob-
lem remains unsolved. The following Section provides a brief
overview of the issues, then moves to examine the compensa-
tion debate that has arisen specifically in the context of the bai-
lout, and then proposes prospective clawback provisions as a
potentially effective response to a long-standing conundrum.
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Part of the concern with executive compensation is that the
amount of payment involved is often contingent, difficult to
value, or, at times, not fully transparent. Many publicly traded
companies provide a large portion of compensation in company
stock or stock options, which have uncertain valuation.25 Other
companies have a large portion of compensation awarded in
year-end bonuses, while others utilize deferred compensation
such as pension obligations. Still others reward executives with
particular perks, such as use of the company jet, club member-
ships, or other fringe benefits.
executive pay and that of average workers continues to expand despite atten-
tion to the issue by the public and regulators).
22. See Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and if So, What
if Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1020-25 (2009)
(stating that American CEOs are paid, on average, about twice as much as
their foreign counterparts). This discrepancy may be a result of the compara-
tively larger role of labor in the foreign corporate governance process. Some
figures, circa 2003, seem to put the gap at five hundred times that of the aver-
age worker. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MIRIAM A. CHERRY, GLOBAL ISSUES IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 202 (2008); CEOs and Their Indian Rope Trick, THE ECON-
OMIST, Dec. 11, 2004, at 61 (arguing that between 1991 and 2003 the pay dif-
ferential between executives and workers more than tripled, and by 2003 "was
over 500 times, and growing").
23. See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation
Reform, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 585, 586 (2007-2008) (describing both corpo-
rate governance and social equality concerns).
24. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation
Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 920-25 (2007) (examin-
ing provisions of the tax code enacted in 1993 intended to limit excessive com-
pensation and concluding that these provisions have actually resulted in in-
creased costs to shareholders).
25. See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Bartz, No. C01-2259, 2002 WL 243597, at *3-4
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2002) (discussing the valuation of stock options).
3732009]
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Yet another form of compensation that has proven to be
controversial is the so-called golden parachute, a payment to
the executive that is typically triggered in the event of a change
of control in the corporation.26 The ostensible reason to adopt
golden parachutes is to align the interest of the management
with shareholders' interests-otherwise, incumbent manage-
ment might resist an acquisition for the purpose of perpetuat-
ing their own tenure.27 However, in the vivid words of one
commentator, golden parachutes conjure the "image of a laugh-
ing executive landing softly with oodles of misappropriated cor-
porate assets while his corporation goes down in flames."2 8
Looked at with skepticism as a payoff to existing management
at the expense of shareholders, these payments have largely
been regulated by unfavorable tax treatment in the Internal
Revenue Code. 29
1. A Theory of Maximum Wages: Managerial Power
In the introduction to this Article, we mentioned the in-
fluential work of Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried,
who have extensively studied different forms of CEO pay and
who have ultimately concluded that widely used incentive-
based payments have failed to deliver on their promise of per-
formance.30 Excessive pay packages in corporations with diffuse
ownership have typically been seen as a classic agency prob-
26. See, e.g., Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Rip-
cords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 957-60 (1987) (analyzing the policy reasons for
adopting such contractual provisions); Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a
Compensation-Shifting Mechanism, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 170, 170-71 (2004)
(discussing the function of golden parachutes and introducing some critiques).
27. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964) (explain-
ing that struggles for corporate control create potential conflicts of interest be-
tween shareholders and executives).
28. Bress, supra note 26, at 960.
29. See I.R.C. § 280G (West Supp. 2009) (making golden parachutes non-
deductible for the payor corporation); I.R.C. § 4999 (2006) (imposing a twenty
percent excise tax on golden parachutes); see also Jamie Dietrich Hankinson,
Golden Parachute Tax Provisions Fall Flat: Tax Gross-Ups Soften Their Im-
pact to Executives and Square D Overinflates Their Coverage, 34 STETSON L.
REV. 767, 770-71 (2005) (describing the tax penalties on excess parachute
payments, and mentioning the possibility that costs for such tax penalties will
merely be shifted back onto shareholders).
30. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 121-85 (arguing that many
incentive-based forms of compensation are susceptible to a decoupling of pay
from performance); see also Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Equity Compensa-
tion for Long-Term Results, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB124516105628518981.html (advocating tying executive compensa-
tion to long-term rather than short-term metrics).
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lem 31-the difficulty a largely passive group of shareholders
has in monitoring the actions of the firm's managers. Profes-
sors Bebchuk and Fried take the argument further, arguing
that excessive compensation packages have their origin in the
reluctance of directors to hold executives accountable for their
performance, due to a structural bias among those who com-
prise boards of directors and management of corporations. 32
Their "managerial power" critique speaks to deep structural
flaws inherent in the separation of ownership and control in
corporations. 33
2. Legal Landscape
The issue of executive compensation has mostly been ad-
dressed in the same way many other corporate governance is-
sues have been-through a fundamental federal dualism.3 4 The
first layer of regulation consists of state law, operating through
state corporate statutes that constrain boards of directors
through the doctrine of fiduciary duty, and at the law's outer
limits, the doctrine of corporate waste. 35 The second layer of
regulation emerges through the federal laws governing the
publicly held corporation, which focus on disclosure, transpa-
rency, and informed investor choice.36
31. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN COR-
PORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 64 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968)
(1932) (discussing the shift from active to passive agency and the resulting
powerlessness of modern shareholders).
32. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 23-44 (arguing that social and
structural factors weaken the independence of corporate boards); see also Mi-
chael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics Theory of Executive Compensation, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2035-52 (2007) (explaining how "groupthink" leads to
suboptimal outcomes among decision-makers with respect to executive com-
pensation).
33. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 45-58 (arguing that market
forces alone are insufficient to align ownership and management interests).
34. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977)
(discussing the differences in approaches between state and federal corporate
regulation).
35. See Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corpora-
tions: Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP.
L. 371, 372-74, 384-90 (2003) (discussing "fiduciary duty" and "reasonable
expectation" analyses across jurisdictions, with particular attention to Oregon
corporate law). See generally John W. Murrey, III, Excessive Compensation in
Publicly Held Corporations: Is the Doctrine of Waste Still Applicable?, 108 W.
VA. L. REV. 433, 435-41, 453-57 (2005) (exploring the evolution of the corpo-
rate waste doctrine under Delaware law).
36. See Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Se-
curities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 450 (2002) ("At its core, the
20091 375
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Unfortunately, these dual approaches have not been par-
ticularly successful at curbing excessive compensation pack-
ages. 37 Undoubtedly, one reason that this might be so is that
complete and accurate information on executive pay has not
been publicly available, despite the ostensible disclosure re-
gime. 38 Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not address ex-
ecutive compensation directly,39 the law did contain provisions
that would allow the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to freeze assets for extraordinary payments, which could
be applied to freeze executives' golden parachutes in the in-
stance of fraud.40 Public companies were no longer allowed to
provide personal loans to management or other insiders-a
form of "hidden" compensation.4 1 In certain circumstances, sec-
tion 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act empowers the SEC to bring
an action to recover money from executives to blame for a
fraud.42 However, this provision (the so-called Sarbanes-Oxley
clawback) has been largely ignored, with the SEC bringing only
two enforcement actions in the seven years Sarbanes-Oxley has
primary policy of the federal securities laws involves the remediation of infor-
mation asymmetries, that is, equalization of the information available to out-
side investors and insiders.").
37. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assess-
ing the SEC's Efforts to Regulate Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
481, 490-507 (2007) (describing gaps left by the different approaches taken in
federal and state regulation of executive compensation); Mary-Hunter Morris,
The Price of Advice, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 153, 154-56 (2009) (arguing
that compensation consultants contribute to the problem of excess executive
compensation).
38. See, e.g., John D. Shipman, The Future of Backdating Equity Options
in the Wake of SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 85 N.C. L. REV.
1194, 1194-95 (2007) (describing how the complex nature of executive pay and
disclosure disguises the true value of compensation).
39. For a general description and analysis of the provisions of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act, see Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate
Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for
Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1055-69 (2004).
40. See SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1045-46 (9th
Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding that golden parachutes are "extraordinary" pay-
ments and thus fall under the purview of the clawback provision); Stephanie
Francis Ward, SEC Can Seize CEO Payouts, 4 ABA J. E-REPORT 13, Apr. 1,
2005 (explaining the significance of the Gemstar ruling).
41. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2006).
42. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2006); Litigation
Release No. 20387, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Former United Health Group
CEO/Chairman Settles Stock Options Backdating Case for $468 Million (Dec.
6, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr2038 7.htm (announc-
ing a settlement with William W. McGuire, former CEO of UnitedHealth
Group, following an enforcement action under section 304).
376 [94:368
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been in effect. 43 As with any law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is on-
ly as powerful as its implementation and enforcement.
Unsurprisingly, then, the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms did not
fix the broken components of executive compensation. 44 The
2006 option-backdating scandal demonstrated that many of the
problems with executive compensation remained unresolved.45
Stock options are ostensibly incentive payments that are tied to
a rise in the company's stock price. In the backdating scandal,
however, companies retroactively adjusted the date of grant of
the options to a date on which the stock price was comparative-
ly low. 4 6 With the benefit of hindsight, the options were guar-
anteed to be "in the money."47 Instead of incentive pay that
would align the executives' interests (and involved risk) with
that of the shareholders, backdated options became guaranteed
43. See Linda Chatman Thomsen & Donna Norman, Sarbanes-Oxley
Turns Six: An Enforcement Perspective, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 393, 408 (2008)
(explaining that the SEC has brought only two enforcement actions under this
provision); see also Rachael E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-
Oxley: An Underutilized Incentive to Keep the Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS.
LAW. 1, 2 (2008) (explaining that only the SEC can bring suit under section
304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
44. See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin & Scott Thurm, Money Rules: Behind Soar-
ing Executive Pay, Decades of Failed Restraints, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2006, at
Al (arguing that despite an initial drop in average compensation following
Sarbanes-Oxley, golden parachutes and other types of compensation have in-
creased executive pay).
45. For an in-depth discussion of the option backdating scandal, see Jesse
M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
853, 857-58 (2008) (listing types of backdating and suggesting that such "se-
cret" compensation arrangements reinforce excessive managerial influence
over boards of directors); see also Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 453, 468-74 (2008) (suggesting prearranged trading plans as a way to
sidestep managerial exploitation of option grants).
46. See David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and
Observations on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 564 (2007).
Although option valuation is complex, at one level the backdating
story is simple. Imagine that on March 15 the stock of Tech Inc. closes
at $50/share. An option on Tech granted on that date would normally
have an exercise price of $50/share. Granting the option 'at the mon-
ey' ensures that the recipient profits only if the shares appreciate in
value and the shareholders profit. But imagine that the CEO of Tech
looks back and notices that on February 15 the company's stock price
was only $40/share. By falsifying the paperwork to make it appear
that the company granted him an at-the-money option on February
15, when in fact the option was granted on March 15, the CEO has ef-
fectively acquired an option that is 'in the money' by $10/share.
Id.
47. See Shipman, supra note 38, at 1200-18 (describing option backdating
and the reforms adopted in response to the scandal, which the author charac-
terizes as largely ineffectual).
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payments. 48 As the adjustments were never disclosed to inves-
tors in periodic filings as they should have been, the SEC inves-
tigated over one hundred companies for engaging in the prac-
tice.49 In the aftermath of the backdating scandal, the SEC
promulgated a series of regulations to govern disclosure of the
value of executive pay. Most notably, the SEC required that an
accurate and extremely detailed valuation of the top executives'
compensation packages, including options and bonuses, be pro-
vided as part of the periodic filings required of publicly traded
companies under the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.50 In
sum, the response to the option backdating scandal has been
increased federal government regulation. Not all, however,
would agree that that the issue of excessive executive compen-
sation merits a similar response.
3. Counterarguments and Rebuttal
Those who believe in less government intervention might
reply that these compensation packages are the result of an ef-
ficient market.5 1 If corporations need to pay well in order to re-
cruit the best talent, they should be allowed to do so, perhaps
cabined in extreme circumstances by the state law doctrine of
corporate waste.52 In certain circumstances, a high degree of
48. See Walker, supra note 46, at 564.
49. See id. at 562 (examining the extent of the scandal).
50. For a general description of these rules, see Sean M. Donahue, Execu-
tive Compensation: The New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules Do Not
Result in Complete Disclosure, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 59, 61 n.3
(2008) (citing to the relevant executive compensation disclosure rules); Leigh
Johnson et al., Preparing Proxy Statements Under the SEC's New Rules Re-
garding Executive and Director Compensation Disclosures, 7 U.C. DAVIs Bus.
L.J. 373, 378-98 (2007) (describing proxy disclosure rules in detail); Kenneth
M. Rosen, "Who Killed Katie Couric?" and Other Tales from the World of Ex-
ecutive Compensation Reform, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2907, 2910-23, 2940
(2008) (providing a detailed discussion of administrative rulemaking around
SEC disclosure rules for executive compensation).
51. See, e.g., John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient
Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1172-79 (arguing that ex-
ecutive compensation is aligned with performance through equity holdings
and stock options); M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Execu-
tive Compensation when Agency Costs Are Low, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1543, 1618
(2007) (contending that compensation arrangements in bankruptcy result in
similarly large pay packages, which potentially disproves the managerial pow-
er thesis).
52. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del.
2006) (noting that corporate waste only arises in the rare, "unconscionable
case where directors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets") (ci-
tation omitted). Although the standard that a plaintiff shareholder has to
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skill could provide a huge benefit, whether in a competitive
sport or in a business context. 53 Additionally, one could argue
that there is a market for executive services, and that it is ap-
propriate to adopt the prevailing wage for a particular skill
set.54
In light of recent events, however, even Judge Richard
Posner has, albeit reluctantly, come to the view that executive
overcompensation is problematic.55 Instead of tying compensa-
tion to the success of the company, it would appear that in
some circumstances executives sought to profit regardless of
the outcome, and that even in the wake of near insolvency, pro-
tected themselves through contractual provisions. While golden
parachutes for executives have long been part of the backdrop
of corporate America,56 this burden has been borne by share-
holders (who preserve the ability to exit), rather than the public
at large. However, as taxpayers have come to realize, excessive
pay practices have now been foisted upon them through the
mechanism of the financial bailouts.
meet in alleging corporate waste under Disney is extremely high, there is some
hint that the doctrine of waste may be making a comeback in Delaware. Spe-
cifically, the shareholder complaint in the Citibank case has moved forward in
part on this basis. See In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d
106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009) (allowing waste claim to survive a motion to dismiss
when "the Company paid the multi-million dollar compensation package to a
departing CEO whose failures were allegedly responsible, in part, for billions
of dollars of losses at Citigroup").
53. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who De-
cides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1619, 1626-61 (2005) (noting the market for vari-
ous services including professional basketball players, and arguing for caution
in reforming executive compensation).
54. For example, in Disney, Michael Ovitz was earning "approximately
$20 to $25 million a year" as the head of Creative Artists Agency. In re Walt
Disney, 906 A.2d at 37. While his compensation package at Disney was enorm-
ous, that pay package did not look unreasonable compared to his earnings and
holdings at Creative Artists. See id. (describing Ovitz's compensation package
negotiations at Disney).
55. See Posner, supra note 22, at 1014, 1045-46 (stating that the execu-
tive compensation problem is "more serious than I believed it to be" and listing
quick responses to principal-agent problems inherent in the corporate form).
56. These practices continue to date. Although a recent study of proxy
statements filed between October 2008 and March 2009 indicates that CEO
pay fell "for only the second time in the past two decades," a number of public-
ly traded companies provided lavish bonuses to their executives-despite deep
losses or a lack of return on equity. See Phred Dvorak, Poor Year Doesn't Stop
CEO Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, at Bl.
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B. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND CLAWBACKS IN THE
GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS
1. Legal Landscape for Bonuses in the Bailout
In the past months, much attention has focused on the
payout of bonuses at companies accepting funds under the gov-
ernment's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), the proposed
(still pending) tax on those bonuses, the later appointment of
Kenneth Feinberg as Special Master ("Compensation Czar"),
and the urging of the Obama Administration that Congress
pass a non-binding shareholder "Say on Pay" law for all public-
ly held companies.5 7 The various Congressional mandates,
Treasury Department interim rules, and executive pronounce-
ments concerning executive compensation are complex, tech-
nical, and largely constitute compromise measures.6 8
Title VII of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009 ("2009 Recovery Act") is aimed at providing aid to large
industries in order to curb the financial crisis.59 As part of its
57. See Geithner Statement Press Release, supra note 7; TARP Standards
Press Release, supra note 7; see also Sarah N. Lynch, Treasury Explains Why
Only 7 Firms Must Answer to Compensation Czar, Dow JONES NEWSWIRE,
June 11, 2009, http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/company-news-story.aspx?storyid=
200906111227dowjonesdjonline000767 (noting that "seven big financial firms
that received bailouts will be subject to heightened oversight of their compen-
sation" by Kenneth Feinberg); Louise Story & Eric Dash, Treasury Plans Wid-
er Oversight of Compensation, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009, at Al (outlining the
Obama administration's plans to monitor executive pay compensation for bai-
lout companies); Cari Tuna & Joann S. Lublin, New Pay Guidelines Raise
Questions, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, June 10, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124467682643104143.html (analyzing the new pay guidelines put forth by
the Obama administration).
58. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon & Mark Maremont, Bankers Face Strict
New Pay Cap, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2009, at Al. Apparently, several econo-
mists within the Obama administration expressed the countervailing concern
that too many restrictions on executive pay might prevent banks from accept-
ing bailout funds, even if it meant that the credit crisis would continue. See id.
59. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-5, div. B, tit. VII, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516-20 (amending the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221 (West Supp.
2009)) (setting forth guidelines that a company must follow to receive bailout
funds). For an analysis of the financial crisis, its causes, and the subsequent
bailouts, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from
the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376 (2008) ("Most of
the causes . . . can be attributed to conflict of interest, investor complacency,
and overall complexity, all exacerbated by cupidity."). See also Steven M. Da-
vidoff & David T. Zaring, Big Deal: The Government's Response to the Finan-
cial Crisis 3 (Nov. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1306342 (describing the gov-
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provisions, the 2009 Recovery Act specifically details limita-
tions on executive compensation in companies that accept gov-
ernment TARP funds. 60 The 2009 Recovery Act states that the
Secretary of the Treasury shall require each bailout recipient
"to meet appropriate standards for executive compensation and
corporate governance."6 1 Critically, the statute requires a "pro-
vision for the recovery . .. of any bonus, retention award, or in-
centive compensation paid to a senior executive officer and any
of the next [twenty] most highly-compensated employees ...
based on [financial results] that are later found to be materially
inaccurate."62 It also prohibits "making any golden parachute
payment to a senior executive officer or any of the next [five]
most highly-compensated employees" so long as "any obligation
arising from financial assistance [in the bailout] . . . remains
outstanding."63 A separate subheading limits "luxury expendi-
tures," 6 4 which may include "entertainment or events," "office
and facility renovations," "aviation or other transportation ser-
vices" or the catchall category of "other activities or events that
are not reasonable expenditures."65 Finally, the section ends by
establishing a "Say on Pay," which requires disclosure of execu-
tive compensation and then a non-binding shareholder vote on
the executive compensation package.66
The most conflicted and troubling portion of the 2009 Re-
covery Act, however, is that in listing the prohibitions on execu-
tive compensation, previous bonuses that were awarded are ex-
pressly exempted from any limitations. 67 Specifically, the law
states that the prohibition on awards of bonuses or restrictive
stock "shall not be construed to prohibit any bonus payment re-
quired to be paid pursuant to a written employment contract
executed on or before February 11, 2009, as such valid em-
ernment's $700 billion asset purchase program as a "massive investment" in
the country's largest financial institutions, and a "partial nationalization
which the United States had never seen before").
60. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 7001 (outlin-
ing limitations on executive compensation).
61. Id. (amending the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
§ 111(b)(2)).
62. Id. (amending § 111(b)(3)(B)).
63. Id. (amending § 111(b)(3)(C)).
64. Id. (amending § 111(d)).
65. Id. (amending § 111(d)(1)-(4)).
66. See id. (amending § 111(e)(1)-(2)).
67. See id. (amending § 111(b)(3)(D)(iii)).
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ployment contracts are determined by the Secretary or the de-
signee of the Secretary." 68
2. Retroactive Application of the Laws to AIG Bonuses
A brief discussion of how these provisions relate to the AIG
bonuses may be instructive. As referenced in the introduction,
the House of Representatives passed legislation to tax a num-
ber of the AIG bonuses at a ninety percent rate, but that bill
has not been passed by the Senate. 69 The pending bill faced
various legal obstacles-one of which, as explained in the pre-
vious Section, was that Congress had seemingly acquiesced in
these very same bonus payments only a month earlier in the
2009 Recovery Act.70 It seems clear that the government had
several opportunities to ensure that excessive bonuses were not
paid but unfortunately failed to act.71 Notwithstanding, it is cu-
rious that AIG seemed to rush to pay bonuses, 72 when the
board of directors might have had valid legal arguments that
68. Id.
69. See To Impose an Additional Tax on Bonuses Received from Certain
TARP Recipients, H.R. 1586, 111th Cong. § 1(a)(2) (2009).
70. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 7001 (amend-
ing the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111(b)(3)(D)(iii)). An
earlier version of the bill had much more serious restrictions, which gave the
company a choice of forfeiting the bonuses or charging the company a high tax
rate. See Jonathan Weisman, Dodd's Amendment at Crux of Bonus Issue,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A4. In providing the choice, Congress might
have avoided the retroactivity problem. Unfortunately those parts of the bill
were eliminated, and now members of Congress are blaming each other for its
erasure. See id.
71. See Solomon, supra note 2 ("Administration officials say they didn't
have enough time to deal with bonuses before AIG . . . [paid them]. They say
[Treasury Secretary] Geithner learned of the payments on March 10-just a
few days after the Treasury loaned another $30 billion to AIG.").
72. Among the justifications for paying out the bonuses was AIG CEO
Liddy's fear that the company would be assessed legal penalties under Con-
necticut labor laws for withholding employee wages. See Letter from Edward
M. Liddy, Chief Executive Officer, Am. Int'l Group, Inc., to Timothy F. Geith-
ner, U.S. Sec'y of the Treasury (Mar. 14, 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/
5a06cc90-118d-llde-87bl-0000779fd2ac.pdf; see also AIGFP EMPLOYEE RE-
TENTION PLAN, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2-3 (2009), http://www.scribd.com/doc/
13291401/AIGFP-Employee-Retention-Plan. However, the Attorney General of
Connecticut expressed doubt about AIG's interpretation. See David G. Savage,
Doing the Math on AIG Bonuses, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at A3 (quoting
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal in saying: "AIG was cate-
gorically wrong when it claimed that state labor law compelled payments of
these outrageous, unconscionable bonuses," and further that the Connecticut
law requiring double payment for a failure to pay wages "does not apply to
AIG bonuses" and was "a joke of a justification to reward financial failure and
fiasco").
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there were defenses to such payment.73 Nonpayment would
have forced the executives to bring suit against AIG, at the
very least providing the company with some delays, a respite
from the scandal, and perhaps given Congress a chance to re-
spond.74
There are further legal concerns with the pending bonus
tax bill. Its narrow focus on particular companies and execu-
tives may raise a concern about whether it constitutes an un-
lawful bill of attainder. 75 All of these legal concerns about the
bill, which without a doubt constitute factors in its lingering
non-passage by the Senate, underscore how difficult it can be to
attempt retroactive remedies in the bonus context.76 That is not
to say that arguments for recovery of these bonuses will be un-
successful; but attempting to impose clawbacks retroactively
through legislation is certainly not as efficient as including
73. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Op-Ed., A.LG.'s Bonus Blackmail, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A27 (listing a number of potential defenses to AIG's
bonus payments, including defenses based on changed circumstances or frau-
dulent conveyance law) [hereinafter Cunningham, Bonus Blackmail]; see also
Posting of Lawrence Cunningham to Concurring Opinions, http://www
.concurringopinions.comlarchives/2009/03/aig-contract-qu.html (Mar. 16, 2009,
14:42 EST). In his analysis, Professor Cunningham was careful to stress that
any opinion about the legality of the contracts would need to start with the or-
ganic documents themselves. See id. ("It is important to see the contracts.").
For the contracts themselves, see AIG Fin. Prods. Corp., 2008 Employee Reten-
tion Plan (Dec. 1, 2007), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs
dem/employeeretentionplan.pdf; AIG Fin. Prods. Corp., Schedule 1 to 2008
Employee Retention Plan, http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financial
svcs dem/confirmation andacknowledgement.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
74. See, e.g., Cunningham, Bonus Blackmail, supra note 73 (listing poten-
tial legal defenses that would excuse AIG from fulfilling its contractual obliga-
tions to pay employee bonuses).
75. See, e.g., Posting of Jonathan Adler to The Volokh Conspiracy, More
on AIG Bonus Tax as Bill of Attainder, http://volokh.comlarchives/archive_
2009_03_22-2009_03_28.shtml#1237734930 (Mar. 22, 2009, 11:15 EST) (sug-
gesting that the bonus tax bill was passed as a means of punishing "the ill-
gotten gains" of AIG employees, and stating that "[w]hen Congress [confiscates
property as punishment], it is a Bill of Attainder.").
76. Before obtaining an eighty percent equity stake, the Department of
the Treasury should have insisted that both AIG and its executives abrogate
all but a small portion of the bonus contracts as a condition of the investment.
Without such a "rescue," the companies would have fallen into bankruptcy,
which would have put the executives on equal footing with all of the company's
other creditors. Faced with a worthless claim for millions in bonuses (or close
to worthless, as they would receive little in the bankruptcy), the executives
would likely have agreed to a reduced bonus amount. Cf. Davidoff & Zaring,
supra note 59, at 20-41 (describing government policy in the bailout as a se-
ries of transactional "deals," wherein the government exhibited classic deal-
making behavior by walking away from situations that were unfavorable).
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clawback provisions organically within the body of the initial
contract.
3. Bonuses at Merrill Lynch
The original recovery bill of fall 2008 established that if the
Department of the Treasury received a "meaningful equity or
debt position in the financial institution" then the recipient of
the aid had to "meet appropriate standards for executive com-
pensation" so long as the government remained a stakeholder.77
However, in the wake of this bill, it came to light that many of
the troubled companies had paid large bonuses to executives
before their woes had arisen, others had actually moved up bo-
nuses even after problems had started, and some companies
were still contractually bound to provide golden parachutes to
departing executives. 78 Estimates have varied wildly as to the
amounts of the bonuses and the number of executives who re-
ceived them.79
There have been allegations that in the wake of its poor
performance and scheduled acquisition by Bank of America,
Merrill Lynch actually moved up the schedule for payment of
bonuses.80 At the time of this writing, the New York Attorney
General was examining the bonus structure and the timing of
payments at Merrill Lynch in order to determine whether the
company violated securities laws in the days leading up to the
77. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111(b)(1), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 5221 (West Supp. 2009).
78. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
79. See Gretchen Morgenson, Gimme Back Your Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2009, at BUl (stating that the top executives at "troubled" American
International Group, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Countrywide Financial, Leh-
man Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Washington Mutual received almost $500
million in performance-based pay since 2005). For a full list of the companies
receiving funds in the bailout, see ProPublica, supra note 1. However, the $500
million figure seems suspiciously low compared to other reports. The AIG bo-
nuses alone have been estimated at almost $200 million, and the New York
Attorney General's Office has estimated that bonus payouts ranged in the bil-
lions. See infra note 81 and accompanying text; see also Cunningham, Bonus
Blackmail, supra note 73 (describing the government's recovery efforts regard-
ing the "$165 million in bonus payments the insurance giant A.I.G. recently
made to nearly 400 employees").
80. See, e.g., Letter from Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State
of N.Y. and Barney Frank, Chairman, House Fin. Servs. Comm. to Kenneth D.
Lewis, Chief Executive & President, Bank of Am. Corp. (Mar. 9, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2009/mar/Letter%20to%20
Kenneth%20Lewis%2003.09.09.pdf (alleging that "late last year [2008], Mer-
rill Lynch moved up its planned date to allocate bonuses and then richly re-
warded many of its executives").
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merger.81 Filings by the Attorney General allege that these bo-
nus payments were, in the aggregate, worth approximately
$3.6 billion and primarily went to enrich seven hundred of the
top employees at Merrill Lynch.82 Adding proverbial insult to
injury, Merrill's then-CEO, John Thain, asked for an additional
bonus at the end of what was a financially disastrous 2008 for
the company. 83 After deliberation, the board of directors de-
cided not to pay Thain the requested bonus because of the po-
tential public outrage it might have engendered. 84 Although
Thain apparently later withdrew his request in the wake of the
board's opposition, the incident prompted further attention
from the Attorney General's Office. 85
4. Analysis and Evaluation of Executive Compensation in the
Bailout
By this point, it should be apparent that the 2009 Recovery
Act's provisions regarding executive compensation are extreme-
ly problematic. Not only was the 2009 Recovery Act weak and
ineffective in its provisions regarding limits on compensation,
the law paradoxically strengthened the AIG executives' claim to
the bonuses by exempting them from regulation. 86 The day af-
81. See Susanne Craig, Merrill's $10 Million Men, Top 10 Earners Made
$209 Million in 2008 as Firm Foundered, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2009, at Al
("New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo has subpoenaed information
about Merrill's highest-paid employees in connection with his probe into $3.6
billion in bonuses paid by Merrill in the days before it was taken over by Bank
of America Corp."); Susanne Craig & Dan Fitzpatrick, Merrill Men Paid Over
$10 Million Subpoenaed, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2009, at Cl (noting that sub-
poenas were issued "to several top Merrill Lynch & Co. executives who were
each paid more than $10 million in cash and stock last year"); Dan Fitzpatrick,
Merrill Pay Scrutinized, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, at A2 (noting that the
New York Attorney General is "conducting his own probe" into the Merrill
Lynch bonuses).
82. See Letter from Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of
N.Y., to the Honorable Barney Frank, Chairman, House Fin. Servs. Comm.
(Feb. 10, 2009), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediascenter/2009/feb/
merrill%201etter.pdf.
83. See Susanne Craig, Heat Turns Up on Merrill Bonuses' Timing, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 12, 2009, at C1 (providing conflicting accounts regarding Thain's
request for a bonus); Louise Story, Bonus Season Afoot, Wall Street Tries for a
Little Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, at B1 (describing Thain's request for
an additional $10 million in bonus compensation).
84. See Story, supra note 83.
85. See id. (reporting that Cuomo wrote a letter in which he severely criti-
cized the idea of additional performance bonuses for those at Merrill Lynch,
calling such a request "a thumb in the eye to taxpayers").
86. See Mark Maremont & Joann S. Lublin, Loopholes Sap Potency of Pay
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ter the 2009 Recovery Act was signed into law, "some critics
identified weaknesses, suggesting the restrictions be retroac-
tively applied to companies that already have received federal
bailout cash."87 Other criticisms included the idea that the
companies might give executives new titles in order to dodge
the restrictions, and that the grants of restricted stock did not
need to be tied to performance. 88 All of these weaknesses were
brought into startling relief by the controversy surrounding the
AIG bonuses.89 As discussed above, there were many ways that
the Treasury Department could have dealt with the bonus is-
sue, but instead the situation was mishandled.90
Although it is not the focus of this Article, we present some
options for addressing the problem that has been created-in a
way that will pass constitutional muster. Public outrage, sham-
ing, and pressure from elected officials (while not technically a
legal remedy) are apparently having some effect on the AIG
bonus recipients. 91 Another avenue would be to revisit the pro-
vision that allows the Secretary of the Treasury the ability to
determine whether the bonus payments were made pursuant to
"valid employment contracts."92 Between the strong public poli-
Limits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at Cl.
87. Id.
88. See id.; see also Kate Kelly & David Enrich, Wall Street Pursues Pay
Loopholes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2009, at Cl.
89. See Weisman, supra note 70. In one version of the bill, Senators Wy-
den and Snowe advocated an amendment that would have capped bonuses at
$100,000 retroactive to 2008. Id. Bonuses paid in excess of that amount would
have to be returned to the Treasury or taxed at a thirty-five percent rate. Id.
While the Wyden-Snowe amendment passed in the Senate, it was dropped
during House and Senate negotiations, amidst concerns that, by taxing 2008
income retroactively, it raised "constitutional objections." Id. Nevertheless,
"[ilts authors argued that because companies were given a choice whether to
return the bonuses or face a tax, the measure was not actually taxing past in-
come but would 'tax' a company's future decision-made with full knowledge
of the consequences." Id.
90. See Pleven et al., supra note 5, at A16 ("A top Democratic lawmaker
suggested that earlier, stricter limits should have been placed on AIG. 'Clearly
there was a mistake at the beginning,' said Rep. Barney Frank. . . ."); see also
Weisman et al., supra note 5, at A4 (suggesting that public outrage was re-
lated to the failure of Congress to specifically tax bonuses).
91. See, e.g., Jake DeSantis, Op-Ed., Dear A.LG., I Quit!, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2009, at A29 (letter from an AIG Financial Products division execu-
tive who, while using strong rhetoric about the validity of contracts, is donat-
ing the approximately $750,000 bonus he received to charity and quitting his
job); see also Brady Dennis, Challenges Remain for AIG, Employees, WASH.
POST, Apr. 14, 2009, at All (noting that employees at AIG's Financial Prod-
ucts division have agreed to return more than $50 million in bonus payments).
92. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
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cy implications, the changed and unusual circumstances of an
infusion of government money, the law of fraudulent con-
veyance, and the Attorney General of Connecticut's statements
that there was never a potential liability issue, there could be a
freeze on these executives' assets until the Secretary of the
Treasury (or the new Special Master/Compensation Czar de-
signee) has an opportunity to review the bonuses for fairness.
State law might provide shareholders some redress in the form
of an action for recovery under the corporate waste doctrine.93
Although typically an exacting legal standard, the magnitude
of the losses and these lavish rewards might actually provide
an important test case for resurrecting the waste doctrine. 94
Finally, other agency or employment law principles, such as the
faithless servant doctrine, might provide some redress for ag-
grieved shareholders.95
While there are possibilities for recovery, retroactive legis-
lative responses or administrative rulemaking are difficult to
fit within existing legal frameworks. Subsequent bills targeting
bonuses distributed by TARP recipients have been introduced,
but have also languished in Congress. 96 The Obama Adminis-
tration and the Treasury Department, under pressure to take
action, have cobbled together a multi-pronged approach in the
months following the public outcry over executive bonuses.
First, Kenneth Feinberg was named as a Special Master
(termed in the media the "Compensation Czar") with oversight
111-5, div. B, tit. VII, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516-20 (amending the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111(b)(3)(D)(iii), 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221
(West Supp. 2009)).
93. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73-75
(Del. 2006) (discussing the corporate waste doctrine).
94. Id. at 74 ("A claim of waste will arise only in the rare, 'unconscionable
case where directors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets."')
(citation omitted).
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (1958) (stating that an
agent who is disobedient or who breaches his duty of loyalty is not entitled to
compensation); see also Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184,
200 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that under New York law, "[olne who owes a duty of
fidelity to a principal and who is faithless in the performance of his services is
generally disentitled to recover his compensation, whether commissions or
salary") (citation omitted). Although perhaps not as apt in the AIG situation,
the faithless servant doctrine might have some application to Merrill Lynch-
if allegations that the dates and timing of particular bonuses are accurate,
that could implicate conflict of interest and duty of loyalty issues.
96. See To Amend the Executive Compensation Provisions of the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 to Prohibit Unreasonable and Exces-
sive Compensation and Compensation Not Based on Performance Standards,
H.R. 1664, 111th Cong. (2009) (awaiting Senate approval).
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responsibility for pay practices at the seven companies receiv-
ing the largest amounts of government assistance.97 Second,
the Treasury Department is now pressing for legislation and
SEC rulemaking that would require a non-binding "Say on
Pay" vote by shareholders at all publicly traded companies.98
Perhaps these recent efforts will finally bring the problem
of excessive executive compensation to a larger national au-
dience that is empowered to seek change. Nonetheless, the
pending bonus tax highlights the problem of attempting a "re-
troactive clawback" through the avenue of legislation. The
question posed then is what, going forward, can we do to fix the
problems identified in a constructive and prospective fashion?
C. REVERSE ALCHEMY: TURNING GOLD INTO LEAD
The credit crisis and subsequent bailouts have cast a long
shadow of uncertainty over many aspects of investment bank-
ing, insurance, mortgage, and other industries. However, in
addition to ensuring that credit continues to be available, the
bailouts might well provide an opportunity for meaningful
reform of executive compensation. 99 One way that this might be
accomplished would be to write clawback provisions into execu-
tive compensation contracts prospectively. The change would
result in the routine and widespread use of clawback provisions
in executive compensation contracts, and could (at some point)
result in a SEC mandate for such provisions.
1. Prospective Voluntary Clawback Provisions
There are some indications that prospective voluntary
clawback provisions might be becoming more commonplace.
Over a year before the first bailout, computer giant Intel was
already voluntarily implementing clawback provisions in the
97. See Stephen Labaton, Treasury to Set Executives' Pay at 7 Ailing
Firms, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at Al (discussing Feinberg's "broad discre-
tion" to set salaries and bonuses at the seven companies).
98. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
99. With a backward-looking glance, some of the federal programs that
helped end the Depression are instructive. Stabilizing the economy is an im-
portant goal, but the New Deal is still better known for its social and regulato-
ry programs than for its Keynesian deficit spending to stimulate economic re-
covery. Cf. William G. Ross, When Did the "Switch in Time" Actually Occur?:
Re-Discovering the Supreme Court's "Forgotten" Decisions of 1936-1937, 37
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1153, 1155-58, 1165-70 (2005) (describing the evolution of Su-
preme Court jurisprudence with respect to social and regulatory legislation
during the New Deal era).
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event that bonuses were paid out in error, on the basis of ac-
counting results that had to be restated.100 A recent study by a
compensation-tracking firm, Equilar, noted that clawback pro-
visions in executive contracts have started to gain more accep-
tance in the past two years.101 The study examined the SEC
disclosures of the ninety-five companies within the Fortune 100
that are publicly traded. 102 The study, however, defines "claw-
back provision" broadly, thus sweeping a large number of con-
tracts, provisions, and policies under this umbrella term, even
if they might not be particularly effective.103 The effectiveness
of any contractual remedy, as discussed in the Appendix, will
depend on the language that the contract uses and how the
clause is structured.
The investment firm Morgan Stanley, which received bil-
lions in the bailout, is one firm that has instituted a voluntary
clawback clause.104 As an internal memorandum from Morgan
Stanley's CEO John J. Mack disclosed at the end of 2008, their
analysis of year-end bonuses also attempted "to tie compensa-
tion more closely to multi-year performance and each em-
ployee's contribution to the Firm's sustainable profitability." 05
The memorandum goes on to state that the compensation
packages will "include a new clawback provision which [Mor-
gan Stanley] will implement as a permanent part of our com-
pensation policy:"
In 2008 and beyond, for all bonus-eligible employees, we are making
part of the year-end bonus deferral a cash award subject to a claw-
back provision that could be triggered if the individual engages in
conduct detrimental to the Firm. The clawback could be triggered if
an individual, for example, caused the need for a restatement of re-
sults, a significant financial loss or other reputational harm to the
Firm or one of its businesses. . . . Starting in 2009, we expect to insti-
tute a multi-year performance plan for senior executives, including
the CEO, that will tie a portion of their compensation directly to the
Firm's performance over a three-year period-with one third of this
100. See Gretchen Morgenson, Intel Can Recover Bonuses It Shouldn't
Have Paid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/
business/31chip.pay.html?ref-businessspecial.
101. See Executive Compensation Trends, EQUILAR, Nov. 2008, at 6-11
(noting that the prevalence of Fortune 100 companies with disclosed clawback
policies increased from 17.6% to 64.2% between 2006 and 2008).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Morgan Stanley Executives Forgo Bonuses, as Program Is
Changed, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/morgan-stanley-executives
-forego-bonuses-as-program-is-changed/ (Dec. 8, 2008, 15:31 EST).
105. Id.
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compensation tied to the Firm's return on equity (ROE), a second
third tied to Morgan Stanley's relative ROE versus our peers, and the
final third tied to total shareholder return on a relative basis.a06
According to a New York Times story, while Morgan Stanley's
clawback is broader, it was actually modeled after an earlier
November announcement by UBS.10 7
In voluntarily adopting and implementing clawback provi-
sions, many companies are attempting to fix the compensation
disconnect. 08 The amount of actual reform, of course, will de-
pend on the specifics of the clawback provision itself.109 Be-
cause these contracts are individually negotiated, there is room
for variation." 0 Some clawback provisions require that an em-
ployee be actually involved in a fraud in order to trigger the re-
payment requirement."1 Others merely require the amounts to
have been paid in error based on incorrect accounting re-
sults. 112
2. The Silver Lining of Prospective Reform
One of the questions that would naturally arise is why cor-
porations would voluntarily choose to institute clawback provi-
sions, or perhaps, the more insightful question is why any lead-
ing executives would agree to them?113 If Bebchuk and Fried
are correct in describing their managerial power thesis, and if
previous efforts to constrain executive pay have been unsuc-
cessful, why would clawback provisions be any different? After
all, executive compensation has either stayed at the same le-
106. Id.
107. See Story, supra note 83.
108. See infra Appendix (referencing clawback provisions, culled from SEC
disclosures, in various corporate compensation policies).
109. See infra Appendix (categorizing clawback provisions according to
those triggered by bad faith, fraud or misconduct, and restatement of financial
results).
110. See infra Appendix.
111. See infra Appendix, Part B.2 (citing the American Express clawback
policy, which triggers only upon the board's finding that an employee's fraud
or misconduct has caused (or partially caused) a restatement of financial re-
sults).
112. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 100 (describing the Intel clawback
provision, which allows recovery of any bonuses "generated by an error or a
misstatement that affected the company's results").
113. Cf. Joann S. Lublin, More Directors Are Cutting Their Own Pay, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 16, 2009, at B1 (describing how directors at several companies,
including General Motors, Ford, Eddie Bauer, and Herman Miller are reduc-
ing their own pay in an effort to show leadership and improve company per-
formance).
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vels or increased, even in the face of tax regulations,114 man-
dated disclosure,115 and shareholder lawsuits.116
There is reason to think, however, that clawback provi-
sions might prove more durable and effective than past efforts.
Politically, this is an excellent time for reform. Currently there
is a high level of public outrage-created in large part by the
economic crisis-at executive pay, the bonuses, the large risks
taken, and the liabilities created for the government.117 Com-
panies therefore have the incentive, for public relations purpos-
es if nothing else, to include contractual clawbacks in their em-
ployment contracts.
Additionally, the political impetus may yet result in gov-
ernment regulation mandating such clawbacks. At the moment,
these contractual clawbacks are voluntary provisions and con-
stitute "best practices.""18 However, some language from the
Treasury Department in a recent press release raises the pos-
sibility that what we might now consider the early emergence
of a "best practice" may become a part of future federal regula-
tion. 119 In a recent release, the Department of the Treasury
stated:
The Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission should work together to require compensation
committees of all public financial institutions-not just those receiving
government assistance-to review and disclose executive and certain
employee compensation arrangements and explain how these com-
pensation arrangements are consistent with promoting sound risk
management and long-term value creation for their companies and
their shareholders. . . . Over the last decade there has been an emerg-
ing consensus that top executives should receive compensation that
encourages more of a long-term perspective on creating economic val-
ue for their shareholders and the economy at large. One idea worthy
of serious consideration is requiring top executives at financial insti-
tutions to hold stock for several years after it is awarded before it can
114. See supra Parts IA, I.B.1-2.
115. See supra Part I.A.2.
116. Cf. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006)
("[Tihe onerous standard for [corporate] waste is a corollary of the proposition
that where business judgment presumptions are applicable, the board's deci-
sion will be upheld unless it cannot be attributed to any rational business
purpose").
117. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 5.
118. Cf. David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 307-08 (2006)
(describing "best practices" in both administrative agencies and business
management as a "curiosity," since the term is oft-used but ill-defined).
119. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New
Restrictions on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.ustreas
.gov/press/releases/tgl5.htm.
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be cashed-out as this would encourage a more long-term focus on the
economic interests of the firm.120
Similar intimations were made in a recent speech by an
SEC official, who suggested that companies not involved in the
bailout might nonetheless wish to follow these limitations for
guidance on best practices. 121 While currently voluntary, these
provisions could be mandated in the future. 122
We believe that the demands for change engendered by the
financial crisis can provide a "silver lining"-a genuine oppor-
tunity for meaningful change in the executive compensation
arena. One of the major problems with executive compensation
has been a focus only upon short-term performance. Such
short-term thinking often leads to opportunistic behavior, at
the expense of the long-term health of the company. By in a
sense operating as a "lead parachute," prospective clawback
provisions begin to align incentives over a longer time frame.
II. CLAWBACKS IN PONZI SCHEMES
The Madoff hedge fund fraud has grabbed headlines the
world over, and with good reason. Apart from its soap opera-
like aspects, 123 both the sheer scope of the fraud and the fact
that ostensibly sophisticated investors across the globe from
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. See JOHN W. WHITE, DIRECTOR, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM'N., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE: OBSERVATIONS ON YEAR
TWO AND A LOOK FORWARD TO THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE FOR 2009 (2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speecbl2008/spchl02108jww.htm (urging nonpartici-
pating institutions to "carefully" consider integrating risk-reducing TARP reg-
ulations into company compensation policies).
122. See Richard R. Floersch, The Right Way to Determine Executive Pay,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2009, at Al5 ("In this climate, those responsible for set-
ting the parameters in the private sector need to start asking the right ques-
tions and taking actions, even if the results aren't popular among executives.
If they don't, Congress will likely seek to change the way compensation is pro-
vided.").
123. Bernard Madoff confessed the fraud to his two sons, telling them he
believed that the losses from the fraud exceeded $50 billion and that he would
turn himself in, but not before distributing some $200 to $300 million in the
fund's accounts to certain employees. In response, the two sons turned Madoff
in to the authorities. See Amir Efrati et al., Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion
Fraud, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at Al. Rene-Thierry Magon de la Villehu-
chet, a prominent investor who traced his lineage to French aristocracy and
had more than $1 billion of his clients' money entrusted with Madoff, commit-
ted suicide when the extent of the loss came to light. See Associated Press,
Suicide Madoff Investor Was 'Honorable Man,' Dec. 24, 2008, http://www
.msnbc.msn.com/id/28368421/.
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Abu Dhabi to Zurich were duped by a sprawling Ponzi scheme
have gained the story a widespread and deserved notoriety.124
Bernard L. Madoff, a former chairman of the NASDAQ
Stock Market and a well-respected figure on Wall Street before
his dramatic arrest in 2008,125 first began to lure investors into
his scheme in the early 1990s.12 6 He attracted not only institu-
tional clients like hedge funds, pension funds, and charitable
organizations,12 7 but also prominent wealthy individuals such
as Steven Spielberg, billionaire art collector Norman Braman,
New York Mets owner Fred Wilpon, and actor Kevin Bacon.128
While his clients were told their investments were turning
handsome profits in a hedge fund, Madoff had not been pur-
chasing any securities in the decade leading to his arrest, never
mind creating a hedge fund.129
In order to keep up appearances, Madoff claimed to have
employed a "split-strike conversion strategy, investing in a
basket of stocks that would closely mimic the price movements
of the Standard & Poor's 100 Index, rotating out of the market
into government-issued securities like treasury bills and hedg-
ing the investments by buying and selling option contracts re-
lated to those stocks."130 Madoff would further provide clients
with false trading confirmations and account statements re-
flecting bogus transactions in support of "this mythical 'split-
strike conversion strategy."131 All the while, Madoff was simply
paying off the early investors with funds generated from later
investors.
Although there were skeptics who have insisted for years
that Madoff could not have been investing his money legiti-
mately, most accepted and believed that Madoff was a skilled
investor with a proprietary investing platform that virtually
124. See Diana Henriques, Vast Wall Street Fraud Knew No Boundaries,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 22, 2008, at 12.
125. See Efrati et al., supra note 123.
126. See Mark Hamblett, Madoff Pleads and Is Led Off to Jail, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 13, 2009, at 1, 7 (summarizing Madoff's guilty plea).
127. See id. at 7.
128. See Keren Blankfeld Schultz & Duncan Greenberg, Bernie Madoff's
Billionaire Victims, FORBES, Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/12/
madoff-guilty-plea-business-wall-street-celebrity-victims.html. No doubt Kevin
Bacon wishes there were more than six degrees of separation between him and
Madoff.
129. See Hamblett, supra note 126, at 7.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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could not lose.132 Indeed, when Madoff was reported to the
SEC, the agency failed to conduct a thorough investigation in
part because of his sterling reputation on Wall Street.133 In re-
trospect, with more complete information on Madoff's invest-
ments, the alleged returns now appear to be virtually-and in
some cases, truly-impossible to achieve. Madoff informed in-
vestors that he returned an average of 15.7% per year since
January 1996.134 Between January 1996 and December 2004, a
loss was reported only for three months, and most months re-
flected between 1% and 1.5% returns.135 Moreover, Madoff
claimed to be executing more option trades than the entire
market had on many days. 136
Unwieldly as it was, the "hedge fund" kept growing until
2008. At that point, presumably because of the downturn in the
economy, it became impossible for Madoff to recruit enough
new money to keep it afloat.137 While Madoff allegedly con-
fessed to running a $50 billion scheme, investigators are still
uncertain about how much money was actually lost.138 Not-
withstanding, the shortfall is staggering given that authorities
have located only about $830 million in assets belonging to
Madoff, including such eclectic items as a $39,000 piano and a
$320,000 boat tragically named "Sitting Bull."13 9 Madoff has
since pleaded guilty in federal court to eleven felony counts, in-
cluding securities fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, money laun-
dering, perjury, and false filings with the SEC.140 On June 29,
132. See Gregory Zuckerman & Kara Scannell, Madoff Misled SEC in '06,
Got Off, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2008, at Al.
133. See id.
134. See Amir Efrati et al., Top Wall Street Broker Accused of Fraud, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.wealth-bulletin.com/people/content/33527711
35/.
135. See id.
136. See Tom Lauricella et al., Madoff Ran Vast Options Game, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 16, 2008, at Al9.
137. See id. (explaining that with the ten percent loss in the stock market
in November 2008, Madoff could no longer attract investors).
138. See Efrati & Frank, supra note 12 (reporting that after admitting to
an initial fifty billion dollars in losses, Madoff subsequently issued statements
indicating he had lost almost sixty-five billion in investments).
139. See Zachery Krouwe, Madoffs Worth $823 Million, a Filing Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at B8.
140. See Press Release, United States Attorney S. Dist. of N.Y., Bernard L.
Madoff Pleads Guilty to Eleven-Count Criminal Information and Is Remanded
into Custody (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/
March09/madoffbernardpleapr.pdf.
394 [ 94: 368
CLAWBACKS
2009, he was sentenced to 150 years in prison.141
Quite apart from its more sensational aspects, however,
the fraud raises a series of complex and intriguing remedial
questions: What remedies, if any, are available to investors who
have lost some or all of their investment ("losing investors") as
against those investors who have profited from the scheme
("winning investors")?142 Do these remedies sufficiently protect
such later investors and do or should they have the effect of de-
terring the fraud in the first place? If not, should we look to
private ordering to solve this problem before turning to regula-
tion?
These remedial questions arise because although the losing
investors can turn to the courts to hold the operator of the
fraud accountable, they are often forced to look elsewhere be-
cause the scheme and the operator are insolvent.143 The Madoff
fraud serves as a prime example: while the investors will al-
ready be in line with other creditors in the Madoff bankruptcy
proceedings, the value of his assets is substantially less than
the loss incurred by the investors.144
In a Ponzi scheme, losing investors would therefore look,
naturally enough, to other solvent investors who have profited
from the scheme, whether witting or not.145 If the winning in-
vestor was aware of the fraud, that investor could be required
to disgorge all payments received, which are avoidable as frau-
dulent transfers.146 Because many, if not most of the investors,
141. See Robert Frank & Amir Efrati, 'Evil' Madoff Gets 150 Years in Epic
Fraud, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at Al.
142. Although in many Ponzi schemes, those who profit are early investors,
and those who lose are investors who enter the fray later, this is not necessari-
ly the case. Whether an investor ends up losing or winning depends on the
structure of the particular scheme and the choices made by the particular in-
vestor.
143. See Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent
and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 159-81 (1998) (stating
that the estates of Ponzi schemes are generally nonliquid and that the great-
est assets of such estates are claims against winning investors).
144. See Associated Press, supra note 138 (noting that while investors may
have lost up to $17 billion, Madoff's assets are estimated at less than $1 bil-
lion).
145. For example, as of May 15, 2009, the trustee had "already sued to re-
cover $10.1 billion from six investors who withdrew substantial amounts from
their Madoff accounts in the final years of the Ponzi scheme." Diana B. Henri-
ques, Trustee Sends $30 Million to Victims of Madoff Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 2009, at B3.
146. See Wyle v. Rider (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 596 n.7
(9th Cir. 1991) ("[W~e assume that the investors had no knowledge of the fraud
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are innocent of the fraud,147 the more useful but difficult ques-
tion-and therefore the subject of this Part of the Article-is
whether any remedies lie as against innocent winning inves-
tors.
A short introduction to Ponzi schemes in general is in or-
der. Named after Charles Ponzi, the operator of the fraudulent
scheme in Cunningham v. Brown,148 a Ponzi scheme is an en-
terprise that "makes payments to investors with monies re-
ceived from newly attracted investors, rather than from profits
of a legitimate business venture. Generally, investors are prom-
ised large returns on their investments, and initial investors
are paid sizeable returns."149 The money from later investors is
then used to repay the earlier investors in order to keep the
scheme afloat.150 Throughout this exercise, the promoter or
Ponzi scheme operator draws off money from the enterprise,
creating a loss. Ultimately, as the enterprise gets further and
further into debt, the scheme collapses, leaving many but not
all investors without their principal investments or the prom-
ised profits. 151 This phenomenon, as described above, is precise-
ly what happened in the Madoff fraud.152 The question that
presents itself is whether the losing investors may proceed
against the winning investors in the course of the bankruptcy
proceedings that often follow.1 5 3
the debtors were perpetrating. If investments were made with culpable know-
ledge, all subsequent payments made to such investors within one year of the
debtors' bankruptcy would be avoidable [as fraudulent transfers], regardless of
the amount invested .... ).
147. See, e.g., Eduardo J. Glas, Redemption Payments Salvaged Prior to the
Collapse of Ponzi Schemes, BANKR. STRATEGIST, July 2007, at 3 (noting that
Madoff's hedge fund "turned out to be a massive Ponzi scheme that snared a
large number of innocent investors").
148. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1924).
149. Collins v. Fisher (In re Lake States Commodities, Inc.), 253 B.R. 866,
869 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).
150. See Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 8 (explaining that the operator was able
to make payments to previous investors solely by obtaining new loans).
151. See id. at 10-i (outlining the consequences of a collapsing Ponzi
scheme).
152. See supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
153. See Nancy C. Dreher, Ninth Circuit Holds that the UFTA Covers an
Action to Recover the Profit Made by Innocent Investors in a Ponzi Scheme, 9
BANKR. SERV. CURRENT AWARENESS ALERT No. 7 (2008) ("A common epilogue
to a collapsed Ponzi scheme is a bankruptcy proceeding, and federal bankrupt-
cy law expressly permits actions under the UFTA."). The investor may addi-
tionally turn to the congressionally created Securities Investor Protection Cor-
poration (SIPC), an institution that insures investor accounts in the event a
brokerage firm fails. See Securities Investor Protection Corporation, Our 38-
[ 94: 368396
CLAWBACKS
As the discussion below will show, to the extent fraudulent
transfer laws apply, any payments made to an innocent win-
ning investor that is in excess-and only in excess-of the
amounts of principal that she originally invested may be reco-
verable as. fraudulent transfers. While this doctrine provides
some protection for the losing investor, it is a less-than-optimal
solution as this will still leave the winning investors in a better
position vis-A-vis the losing investors, even though both groups
may be equally innocent and pure circumstance alone deter-
mines which group any investor falls into. Further, such dispa-
rate outcomes may provide a disincentive to an investor to dis-
close any post-investment discovery of such fraud at least until
that investor's principal is recouped. 154 The introduction of
clawback provisions in such investment contracts will not only
potentially allocate the loss and therefore risk more evenly, it
will also counter the disincentive to disclose. Significantly, be-
cause investors cannot generally determine beforehand wheth-
er they will be winning or losing investors, investors as a group
will have the incentive to rely on and thus include clawback
provisions in their investment contracts.
A. RECOVERY UNDER FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAWS
To recover fraudulent transfers made by a debtor, a trus-
tee may bring a claim under either § 548 or § 544(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which incorporates state fraudulent transfer
laws.155 In most states, such laws are derived from either the
Year Track Record for Investors, http://www.sipc.org/who/sipctrackrecord.cfm
(last visited Nov. 8, 2009). Unfortunately, the SIPC only insures up to
$500,000 per account and the scale of the Madoff fraud coming after the fail-
ure of Lehman has led the CEO of SIPC to question whether "SIPC's resources
will be adequate" to cover current losses. See Posting of Mary Pilon to The
Wallet, Wall Street Journal Blog, Is the SIPC Sick? http://blogs.wsj.com/
wallet/2009/01/30/is-the-sipc-sick/ (Jan. 30, 2009, 11:01 EST). As of May 15,
2009, 125 claims have been approved for payment of losses adding up to $368
million. See Henriques, supra note 145. Almost all of the checks that have
been mailed were for $500,000. See id.
154. See infra notes 204-04 and accompanying text.
155. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548 (2006). See generally McDermott, supra note
143, at 159-81. Additionally, the trustee may be able to recover certain pay-
ments to the investors as a preference. See id. at 188. However, because prefe-
rential transfer law under the Bankruptcy Code applies only to transfers made
within the ninety-day period prior to the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy case,
see 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006), its reach will generally be more limited than that
of fraudulent transfer laws. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006) (allowing the trustee to
reach back two years in certain circumstances); cf. McDermott, supra, at 181
(noting the potential advantage of a preference action in allowing the trustee
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Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) or the older Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA).156 "[T]here are but a few
substantive distinctions between the two uniform statutes, or
between the two statutes and [section] 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code."15 7 One major distinction among the provisions is the ap-
plicable reachback period: While § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
allows avoidance of only those transfers made within two years
of the petition date,158 the reachback time period for fraudulent
transfer claims under most state laws (which are based on ei-
ther the UFTA or UFCA) is four years.159 In general, however,
"the basic principles governing fraudulent transfer actions are
the same, regardless of the statutory basis used."160
As a typical example, the UFTA provides in relevant part
that:
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as
to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made
the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor; or
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
to recover the return of an investor's principal, even though the investor made
the investment in good faith).
156. See David F. Kurzawa II, Note, When Fair Consideration Is Not Fair,
11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461, 464-65 (2002).
157. See McDermott, supra note 143, at 159-60.
158. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).
159. See Lisa A. Dunsky, In re Bayou Group, LLC: The "Hotel California"
Effect in Bankruptcies of Fraudulent Hedge Funds, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES
L. REP., Feb. 2008, at 15 (noting that although it varies by state, the reach-
back period for fraudulent transfer claims is typically four years, and further
distinguishing the reachback period from the statute of limitations governed
by § 546(a) of the Bankruptcy Code); see also David R. Weinstein & Gil Ho-
penstand, Reachbacks, Statutes of Limitation and Deadlines: Demystifying the
Avoiding Powers, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 63, 65 n.12 (2007) ("The pertinent
provisions of the UFTA, usually § 9 [which describes a period of four years],
are most often the source of the 'look back' period . . . .").
160. Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 483
n.3 (D. Conn. 2002); see also Rieser v. Hayslip (In re Canyon Sys. Corp.), 343
B.R. 615, 634 n.15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006) ("The fraudulent transfer provi-
sions of the Code and the UFTA are substantially similar.") (citation omitted);
Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc. v. Spitters (In re Pajaro Dunes Rental Agen-
cy, Inc.), 174 B.R. 557, 572 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that case law re-
garding bankruptcy proceedings may be cross-referenced even if it discusses
an alternative statutory basis).
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(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transac-
tion for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have be-
lieved that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to
pay as they became due.161
Courts have applied fraudulent conveyance laws to allow
receivers or trustees in bankruptcy to recover money from win-
ning investors in a Ponzi scheme.162 Specifically, there are two
theories of recovery that a trustee may rely upon under the
fraudulent conveyance laws in these circumstances: actual
fraud and constructive fraud.163 However, under either theory,
a trustee's recovery as against the innocent winning investor
will generally be limited to recovering the profits earned by the
winning investor, and will not extend to any amount
representing a return of the investor's principal.164
In recovering under either theory, the trustee must prove
that the debtor (i.e., Ponzi scheme operator) had "an interest"
in the property transferred.165 There is no dispute in many
fraudulent transfer actions arising in the context of bankrupt-
cies involving Ponzi schemes that funds received involve prop-
erty in which the debtor has an interest.166 To the extent that
proposition has been disputed, courts have generally rejected
such challenges, and have held that debtors under these cir-
cumstances have an interest in funds transferred to the inves-
tors.167
161. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a), 7A U.L.A. pt.II, at 58 (2006).
162. See, e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 757-58 (7th Cir. 1995) (re-
quiring a profiting investor to return the amount of the profits to a receiver);
Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In re Agric. Research & Tech. Group),
916 F.2d 528, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1990).
163. See McDermott, supra note 143, at 159-60.
164. See id. (noting that recovery is limited to profits unless the profiting
investor had knowledge of the fraud).
165. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b)(1), 548(a)(1) (2006); see also McDermott, supra
note 143, at 160.
166. See McDermott, supra note 143, at 161 (explaining that in many cases
the property in dispute was either property belonging to the debtor, or proper-
ty in which he had an interest).
167. See, e.g., Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House), 77 B.R. 843,
854 (C.D. Utah 1987) ("[Wjhen a debtor obtains money by fraud and mingles it
with other money so as to preclude any tracing and when the defrauded party
... accepts benefits under his contract with the debtor, the money is 'property'
of the debtor within the meaning of §§ 547 and 548 of the Code."); Rieser v.
Hayslip (In re Canyon Sys. Corp.), 343 B.R. 615, 635 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006)
("Payments made to investors in a Ponzi scheme constitute 'transfers' within
the meaning of both § 101(54) of the Code and § 1336.01(L) of the Ohio UFTA.
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To recover under the actual fraud theory, the trustee must
further prove that the debtor made transfers to the winning in-
vestor "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" the los-
ing investors, 16 8 a burden readily met under these circums-
tances given that courts have held that "the mere existence of a
Ponzi scheme is sufficient to establish [such] actual intent."169
Although proving actual fraud would ordinarily allow the trus-
tee to recover all transfers made to a winning investor, includ-
ing amounts which could be considered return of principal,
there is a good faith defense that permits an innocent winning
investor to retain funds up to the amount of the principal.170
To recover under the constructive fraud theory, the trustee
must additionally show that the transfer was made: (1) with
the debtor receiving "less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer;" and (2) under circumstances in-
volving one of three insufficient funds situations (including the
situation where the debtor was insolvent at the time of trans-
fer) or else to an insider under an employment contract and
outside the ordinary course of business.' 7 '
Further, a Ponzi scheme operator possesses a property interest in the trans-
ferred funds.") (citations omitted); Floyd v. Dunson (In re Ramirez Rodriguez),
209 B.R. 424, 432 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997) ("Funds obtained from investors in a
Ponzi scheme are property of debtor, and are thus susceptible to preferential
and fraudulent disposition by debtor."); Jobin v. Lalan (In re M & L Bus.
Mach. Co.), 160 B.R. 851, 857 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993) (noting that because the
investors gave their money voluntarily, the debtor had a legal right to posses-
sion) ("It is elemental property law that one of the 'interests in property' in-
cluded in the total bundle of property rights is the right of possession. All that
§ 548 requires is the transfer of an 'interest' by the Debtor."). Id.
168. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A).
169. Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 704 (9th
Cir. 2008); cf. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 548.04[2][a] (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2009) (noting that the plaintiff meets the re-
quirement on demonstrating that the transferor "acted under circumstances
that preclude any reasonable conclusion other than that the purpose of the
transfer was fraudulent as to creditors").
170. According to § 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code:
[A] transferee or obligee of . . . a [fraudulent] transfer or obligation
that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any
interest transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred . . . to the
extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in ex-
change for such transfer or obligation.
11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (emphasis added); see also Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d
750, 757 (7th Cir. 1995) (allowing a winning investor to keep all repaid
principal because he invested in good faith). See generally McDermott, su-
pra note 143, at 175-81 (explaining the good faith defense in the context
of actual fraud).
171. Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides as follows:
(a)(1)The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or
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Courts in general hold that a debtor does not receive a rea-
sonably equivalent value for any payments made to the win-
ning investor that represent profits since such profits are re-
garded as having been gained through theft from losing
investors. 172 Where the winning investor receives more than
was invested, such "[p]ayments in excess of amounts invested
are considered fictitious profits because they do not represent a
return on legitimate investment activity."173 In contrast, courts
generally hold that a debtor receives value for returning an in-
vestor's principal investment.174 The rationale here is that the
investor has a claim for restitution against the debtor for the
investor's principal investment by virtue of the debtor's
fraud;175 this claim constitutes a debt owed by the debtor to the
investor.176
for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) of an in-
terest of the debtor in property, or any obligation (including any obli-
gation to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment con-
tract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within
2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor volun-
tarily or involuntarily:
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in ex-
change for such transfer or obligation; and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation;
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to en-
gage in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining
with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital;
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur,
debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts
matured; or
(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or in-
curred such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an
employment contract and not in the ordinary course of business.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a). See generally McDermott, supra note 143, at 164-73 (ex-
plaining the elements of constructive fraud in the context of Ponzi schemes).
172. See Scholes, 56 F.3d at 757 (requiring a winning investor to return the
profits that constituted a theft from later investors); Dreher, supra note 153,§ 7.
173. Fisher v. Sellas (In re Lake States Commodities, Inc.), 253 B.R. 866,
872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (citations omitted).
174. See McDermott, supra note 143, at 165.
175. See, e.g., Wyle v. Rider (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 595
(9th Cir. 1991) (noting that investors have a claim to restitution because they
were "duped" into buying solar modules); Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659,
664 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the debtor owes a debt to the creditors).
176. The Bankruptcy Code defines a "claim" as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judg-
ment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-
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Additionally, proving the existence of one of the three in-
sufficient funds situations is typically a straightforward matter
for the trustee because courts have held that a debtor operating
a Ponzi scheme is deemed insolvent from its inception as a
matter of law.177
As a result, federal courts generally determine whether the
investor is liable by applying the so-called netting rule.178 Un-
der this rule, amounts transferred by the Ponzi scheme perpe-
trator to the investor are netted against the initial amounts in-
vested by that individual. 179 If the net is positive, the receiver
has established liability, and the court then determines the ac-
tual amount of liability, which may or may not be equal to the
net gain, depending on factors such as whether transfers were
made within the relevant reachback period or whether the in-
vestor lacked good faith. 80 If the net is negative, the good faith
(innocent) investor is not liable because as described above,
payments received in amounts less than the principal invest-
ment are not avoidable under fraudulent transfer laws.181
Thus, the general rule regarding recovery as against inno-
cent winning investors in Ponzi schemes is that only payments
made to them in excess of the amounts of principal originally
invested are avoidable as fraudulent transfers. The remaining
assets in the scheme, as well as the fraudulent transfers recov-
ered, are then ratably distributed among all of the creditors,
tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;
or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to
an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2006). Section 101(12) defines "debt" as a "liability on a
claim." Id. § 101(12).
177. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 8 (1924) (explaining that
a Ponzi scheme debtor was always insolvent and became more so each day the
business continued); Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006) (ob-
serving that a Ponzi scheme "is, as a matter of law, insolvent from its incep-
tion") (citation omitted); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 17 (N.D. Ohio 1972)
(noting that it was possible to establish that a Ponzi scheme was insolvent
from its very inception); Cuthill v. Kime (In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd.), 319 B.R.
245, 253 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) ("Insolvency of the debtor as required by
§ 548(a)(1)(B) is established, when the Debtor is operating a Ponzi scheme.").
178. See McDermott, supra note 143, at 168-69; id. at 169 n.49 (referring
to the rule as the "netting" rule).
179. See id. at 168-69.
180. See id. (pointing out that an investor may be liable for all repayments,
including returned principal, if they lacked good faith).
181. See supra Part II.A.
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both losing investors and other non-investor creditors of the es-
tate.182 Broadly speaking, the rationale for this approach is that
"winners" in the Ponzi scheme, even if innocent of any fraud
themselves, are not in an equitably stronger position vis-i-vis
the losing investors, and should not be permitted to benefit at
the expense of the losing investor. As one court framed the is-
sue:
The money used for the [underlying investments] came from investors
gulled by fraudulent representations. [The defendant] was one of
those investors, and it may seem "only fair" that he should be entitled
to the profits on trades made with his money. That would be true as
between him and [the Ponzi scheme operator]. It is not true as be-
tween him and either the creditors of or the other investors in the
corporations. He should not be permitted to benefit from a fraud at
their expense merely because he was not himself to blame for the
fraud. All he is being asked to do is to return the net profits of his in-
vestment-the difference between what he put in at the beginning
and what he had at the end.isi
This observation would, technically, hold true for the Ma-
doff fraud as well. To the extent the investors in the Madoff
fraud are equally blameless, courts could hold that the investor
who pulls out early to cash in on the profit is on par, equitably
speaking, with the investor who leaves funds in and therefore
loses his investment, and treat the former's profits as fraudu-
lent transfers.
B. THE RESULTING INEQUITY BETWEEN WINNING AND LOSING
INVESTORS
The remedies currently provided under the law are less
than satisfactory since it will be a matter of chance whether a
particular innocent investor is a winning or a losing investor.
In other words, even though both the winning and the losing
investor are equally blameless, the latter will suffer the greater
loss in relative terms quite simply because that investor was
"not so lucky."184 As noted above, it is precisely this unfairness
that justifies the treatment of any payments made to the win-
ning investors representing profit that is avoidable as fraudu-
182. See McDermott, supra note 143, at 158 ("mhe bankruptcy trustee
must collect whatever assets are available in order to pay both the investors
who lost money and any other creditors of the estate.").
183. Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 757-58 (7th Cir. 1995).
184. Wyle v. Rider (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 596 (9th Cir.
1991).
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lent transfers and requires their disgorgement for the benefit of
the losing investors.185
While ameliorating the situation to some degree, fraudu-
lent conveyance laws are highly unlikely to bring both sets of
investors to parity.186 This disparity is further compounded by
the fact that while payments of fictitious profit are potentially
avoidable as fraudulent conveyances, the relevant reachback
period may further restrict the payments the Ponzi scheme in-
vestor is required to repay. Only transfers made within the
reachback period are avoidable.187 In the case of an extensive
fraud like that perpetuated by Madoff, the Ponzi scheme can
extend over a decade. Those initial and innocent winning inves-
tors who withdrew their money, say, ten years ago, would effec-
tively be removed from the equation.
For these reasons, "courts have long held that it is more
equitable to attempt to distribute all recoverable assets among
the defrauded investors who did not recover their initial in-
vestments rather than to allow the losses to rest where they
fell." 88 Indeed, because the typical losing investor nonetheless
remains at an unfair disadvantage,18 9 courts have sought to
rectify the balance in other ways.
For example, courts have begun to adopt a narrower read-
ing of the good faith defense so as to potentially reach all pay-
ments received by an investor from the scheme, and not just
the amounts representing the fictitious profits. In In re Bayou
Group, LLC, a recent case involving another massive hedge
fund fraud, the Ponzi scheme persisted for years as a result of
management's falsification of its financial disclosures and frau-
185. See supra notes 182-82 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Accord-
ing to the Receiver, in this case approximately 6,000 investors participated in
the . .. Ponzi scheme, but only about 800 received back more than their initial
investment. It is likely that many of the other 5,200 losing investors will see
only a portion of their initial investment returned."); cf. id. ("[A]ssets recov-
ered after a collapsed Ponzi scheme typically are insufficient to satisfy claims
by losing investors" (citing McDermott, supra note 143, at 158-59).).
187. See Warfield v. Alaniz, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1130-31 (D. Ariz. 2006)
(holding that a court-appointed receiver could not base his claims under Ari-
zona's UFTA on fraudulent transfers that took place outside of the relevant
time period), aff'd 569 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2009); Neilson v. Union Bank of
Cal., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1145-46 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (explaining that a claim
of intentional fraudulent transfer under California's UFTA is extinguished if it
is not made within the statutory period); see also supra notes 165-66 and ac-
companying text.
188. Donell, 533 F.3d at 776.
189. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
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dulent misrepresentation of its investment performances. 190
This was facilitated in part by management's termination of its
independent auditor and the creation of a fictitious accounting
firm to pose as the independent auditor. 191 The court ruled that
under the actual fraud recovery theory, 192 winning investors
would have to hand back their principal as well as their profits,
even though they were not responsible for the fraud, if there
was evidence that they redeemed their investments after there
was a "red flag" that "put[] the investor on notice of some po-
tential infirmity in the investment such that a reasonable in-
vestor would recognize the need to conduct some investigation"
and the investor failed to do SO. 193 In the Bayou case, for exam-
ple, one "red flag" might be the lack of an independent auditor
if diligent investigation would have revealed the need for
one. 194 Already, some commentators have highlighted the po-
tential applicability of the ruling in Bayou to Madoff fraud liti-
gation. 195
Notwithstanding the broad reading of applicable fraudu-
lent conveyance law, however, the law as it stands cannot in
most cases return both sets of investors to parity. It cannot, in
other words, require every innocent investor to surrender as
fraudulent transfers any and all payments received by the in-
vestor from the scheme for equitable redistribution among all
innocent investors on a pro rata basis, in accordance with the
principal amount invested. Such a result is, however, potential-
190. Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re
Bayou Group, LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 822 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
191. See id. at 842-43.
192. See id. at 844.
193. Id. at 848. More specifically, the court held:
[A] defendant may establish his [good faith] defense [to a fraudulent
conveyance claim] if he can prove by a preponderance of the credible
objective evidence that his request for redemption was in fact the re-
sult of a good faith reason other than his knowledge of 'red flags,' even
if he was on inquiry notice and did not make inquiry before redeem-
ing.
Id. at 849.
194. See id. at 850-52; see also id. at 846 ("Once on inquiry notice, a trans-
feree's failure to conduct a 'diligent investigation' is fatal to the 'good faith' de-
fense.").
195. See, e.g., Mark Hosenball, Made Money with Madoff? Don't Count on
Keeping It, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 12, 2009, at 9 (reporting that the KL Gates law
firm, which represented the victims in the Bayou case, claimed that Bayou
"provide[s] instructive guidance to [Madoff] investors and other affected par-
ties").
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ly achievable with the use of contractual clawbacks in the un-
derlying investment contracts.
C. CONTRACTUAL CLAWBACKS IN PONZI SCHEMES
In examining contractual clawbacks in the context of in-
vestment agreements, this Section will consider in turn the
function of clawbacks, their structure, and their desirability
from both the perspective of the investor and public policy.
1. The Function of Contractual Clawbacks
Contractual clawbacks in investment agreements provide a
way of minimizing the risk that any individual investor will be
left in the position of a losing investor in the event the invest-
ment turns out to be part of a Ponzi scheme. Instead of depend-
ing on courts to impose clawback payments made to winning
investors at the back end-a remedy whose reach, as discussed
above, is generally limited to a payment amount representing
the (fictitious) profits' 96-the investor could in theory better
protect herself prospectively by including a provision in the in-
vestment contract that would claw back all amounts paid out to
investors contingent on the fund becoming insolvent as a result
of fraud. The provision would also establish that the amounts
so recovered would then be distributed to all investors on a pro
rata basis.
The contractual clawback effectively eliminates the distinc-
tion between winning and losing investors, since all investors
would be treated similarly under the provision. The net result
is that the risk of fraud in any investment would be more
equally allocated among the investors. Such a risk distribution
arguably reflects more accurately what the reasonable investor
would have expected in the first instance, but which expecta-
tion turns out to be false and can be restored post facto only to
a limited extent. Clawbacks in investment contracts therefore
operate to ensure that investors' expectations concerning risk
allocation are not shortchanged.
2. The Structure of Contractual Clawbacks
We believe clawback provisions would, on balance, benefit
good faith investors if adopted into the standard boilerplate of
investment contracts. Here, we propose, as one example, lan-
guage for such a clause:
196. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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In the event of the investment fund becoming insolvent because of
fraud, the investor agrees that any payments received by the investor
under the fund representing any amount of principal invested may be
recovered by an appointed Representative and deposited in a central
repository for subsequent redistribution to all investors in amounts
pro-rated according to the amount of principal invested by the partic-
ular investor.197
A potential complication, however, is that there is typically
no contractual privity among the investors themselves.198 Ra-
ther, the investment structure usually consists of individual,
separate contracts between each investor and the investment
fund. 99 Since the contractual clawback would bind only the
particular parties to the contract, an investor would be bound
under the provision to surrender all funds received without the
assurance that other investors would do the same. In essence,
the contractual clawback as rendered above would function as a
third-party beneficiary contract.200
One way of addressing the lack of contractual privity would
be to qualify the contractual clawback with a reciprocal clause
so that only investors with similar provisions in their invest-
ment contracts would be permitted to enforce the clawback. 201
197. The contractual clawback is limited to payments representing any
amount of the principal invested since any payments in excess of that amount
represent fictitious profits and will be treated as fraudulent transfers for redi-
stribution to losing investors and all other creditors. See supra notes 172-73
and accompanying text.
198. 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37:1 (Richard A.
Lord ed., West Group, 2000); cf. Cheney v. Powell, 15 S.E. 750, 751 (Ga. 1892)
(holding that privity of contract may exist in the context of fraud if there is
conspiracy between parties).
199. 13 WILLISTON, supra note 198, § 37:1.
200. See generally Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A
Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1177-1209
(1985) (discussing the evolution of third-party beneficiary contracts since
1964). Under the Restatement approach, for example, a third party may re-
cover if it is an "intended beneficiary" of the contract. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). To satisfy this requirement, the third
party must show, among other things, that allowing a contract remedy will
"effectuate the intention of the parties." Id.
201. An example of a reciprocal provision is the statutory provision regard-
ing an alien's privilege to sue:
Citizens or subjects of any foreign government which accords to citi-
zens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against their
government in its courts may sue the United States in the United
States Court of Federal Claims if the subject matter of the suit is oth-
erwise within such court's jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 2502(a) (2006). An illustration of this statute's operation can be
found in the case of Henriquez & Gornell, Inc. v. United States where the court
noted that a Panamanian citizen could sue the United States because the "Re-
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For example, the sample contractual clawback above might lim-
it the beneficiaries of the subsequent redistribution to investors
with contractual clawbacks in their investment contracts, read-
ing as follows:
In the event of the investment fund becoming insolvent because of
fraud, the investor agrees that any payments received by the investor
under the fund representing any amount of principal invested may be
recovered by an appointed Representative and deposited in a central
repository for subsequent redistribution among those investors whose
investment contracts contain similarly-rendered clawback provisions
in amounts pro-rated according to the amount of principal invested by
the particular investor.
It is, of course, entirely possible that any clawback provi-
sion in the particular investment contract is a standard clause
in all investment contracts entered into by the investment fund
with its investors, so that a clawback would by default be in-
cluded in all contracts. Indeed, the investment fund would ap-
pear to have little incentive to remove such a clawback since
the provision reallocates the risk of loss only as among the in-
vestors, and has no impact on its bottom line. If, in fact, the
contractual clawback becomes a standard provision, the prob-
lems arising from the lack of privity would be much dimi-
nished, as would the need for reciprocal clawbacks.
3. The Desirability of Contractual Clawbacks
Thus far, we have assumed that investors will find contrac-
tual clawbacks desirable because they will want a more even
distribution of the risk of loss. This may not be true, however,
of all investors. Because the winning investor in a situation not
involving contractual clawbacks (and who thus gets to keep
payments received up to the amount of the principal invested)
will nevertheless suffer a comparatively smaller loss than the
investor who gets a pro rata distribution as a result of a con-
tractual clawback, there may be investors who would prefer to
gamble on the odds of ending up a winning investor and reject
such a clawback provision.
It bears noting, however, that the comparative upside is as
minimal as the downside is significant-the winning investor
at best breaks even and does not get to keep any profits, where-
public of Panama accords to citizens of the United States the right to prose-
cute claims against the Republic in its courts. Therefore, under the reciprocal
provision of Title 28 U.S.C. 2502 (Alien's Privilege to Sue) plaintiff is entitled
to bring its contract claim against the defendant in this court." 180 Ct. Cl.
1040, 1049-50 (1967).
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as the losing investor may forgo the entire principal invested.
As such, and since it is not possible in general to determine ex
ante whether one will be a winning or losing investor, we be-
lieve that the rational investor will have an incentive to include
a clawback in its investment contract.202
Whether investors desire clawbacks is a separate question
from whether clawbacks are desirable from a public policy
perspective. However, to the extent we agree that equally inno-
cent victims of a fraud should not bear the resulting loss une-
qually simply because of pure circumstance-a conclusion that
courts themselves have reached 203-the two considerations, and
therefore their solutions, converge.
Further, the disparate outcome between winning and los-
ing investors may provide an investor the incentive to delay
disclosing any post-investment discovery of fraud at least until
the investor recoups his principal. Conversely, because an in-
vestor subject to a contractual clawback will generally stand to
recover more the earlier the fraud is discovered, the incentive
structure is reversed in favor of disclosure at the earliest possi-
ble time. Also, winning investors currently have no incentive to
be involved in the bankruptcy and indeed may actively avoid
participation, thereby potentially depriving the trustee of use-
ful information about the fraud.204 Indeed, winning investors in
the Madoff fraud are apparently being advised to avoid litiga-
tion, and "to stay off the radar screen of the trustee who is fi-
guring out how to pursue the Madoff firm's remaining assets-
including potential 'clawback' recaptures of purported profits
paid to early investors."205
202. It may be the case that the initial investors in a smaller fund will, in
fact, be aware of their status as such, and will not have the incentive to agree
to contractual clawbacks. Presumably, however, such investors will constitute
a small proportion of the investor population. Also, to the extent that such in-
vestors are put on notice of fraudulent behavior with regard to the fund, which
may be more likely under these circumstances, all payments made to them
may be recoverable as fraudulent transfers under an actual fraud recovery
theory since they will be unable to assert a good faith defense. See supra notes
146, 168-69 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
204. Cf. Christine Seib, Madoff Winners Stash Their Profits, THE AUSTRAL-
IAN, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.aulbusiness/story/
0,,25192402-5017996,00.html?from=marketwatchrss ("Investors facing the
clawback are confused about whether to submit a claim for compensation from
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation . . . . Jason Cowart, a partner
with Pomerantz, a New York-based class-action specialist, said that clients
were 'deeply concerned' at the prospect of losing more money in a clawback.").
205. Martha Neil, Some Madoff Investors Made Money-and Are Now Ly-
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It may be that the more equitable reallocation of risk re-
sulting from the use of contractual clawbacks results in a gen-
erally less vigilant investor since the reallocation reduces the
risk of catastrophic loss for any individual investor. Even so,
decreased vigilance is arguably an acceptable price for using
contractual clawbacks since there is no assurance that main-
taining current levels of vigilance would in fact result in earlier
discoveries of fraud-witness the SEC's Madoff investigation
debacle 206-whereas under a regime of contractual clawbacks,
it is a certainty that when fraud is discovered, all innocent in-
vestors will be treated on an equal footing.207
III. A DOCTRINE OF CLAWBACKS
As noted in the introduction, the media and other commen-
tators have used the term "clawback" extensively in the past
few months, but in a reflexive way, with no consensus as to
what is meant by the term.208 "Clawback" has been generally
used to refer to any action for recoupment of a loss. Meanwhile,
"clawback" has taken on narrow meanings for terms of art
within specialized corners of legal doctrine. For example,
"clawbacks" have been used in venture capital agreements to
spread profits and losses among funds,209 and to describe every-
thing from the effect of federalism on Medicare regulations,210
to the taxation of real estate investment trusts (REITs) and
other investment vehicles, as well as statutory provisions re-
ing Low, A.B.A. J.L. NEWS NOW, Jan. 23, 2009, http://abajournal.com/news/
somemadoffinvestors mademoneyand.are.nowjlyingjow.
206. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
207. See supra Part II.C.2.
208. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and
the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 73-74 (2006) (de-
scribing "clawbacks" as a term of art used in venture capital fund contracts to
ensure that a venture capitalist "receives no more than her specified percen-
tage of fund profits upon the termination of a fund").
210. See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending,
Unclear Implications for States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 441, 445 (2008) ("As a result of the new Medicare drug benefit, the Claw-
back provision ... [requires] states to pay the federal government ... "); Eliz-
abeth A. Weeks, Cooperative Federalism and Healthcare Reform: The Medi-
care Part D "Clawback" Example, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 79, 82
(2007) (describing clawbacks in the healthcare context as a federal provision
that conditions states' receipt of Medicare funds on payments to the federal
government).
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garding the extraterritorial application of a nation's laws.211
Finally, in electronic discovery, a "clawback agreement" also re-
fers to an instance where the parties to a lawsuit make a pros-
pective agreement that any information inadvertently and in-
appropriately disclosed during the discovery process will be
returned.212
Notwithstanding this plethora of references, the standard
contracts treatise contains nary a section, never mind a chap-
ter, on the elusive "clawback."213 And even though the term is
not of recent provenance, there is little sign of any consensus on
"clawback doctrine," since the term has been subject to neither
rigorous analytical scrutiny nor definition and exposition.
Thus, the challenge for this Article in proposing a doctrine of
clawbacks is to determine where one might find clawbacks in a
contracts treatise, what the chapter on clawbacks would say,
and how it would relate to other established bodies of contract
doctrine.
We begin the exercise by identifying what appear to be two
distinctive features common to many applications of the term
"clawback." The first feature, adumbrated in its very name, is
that a clawback is a recovery device that is potentially draco-
nian but justifiable under the triggering circumstances because
of an inherent unfairness that would otherwise prevail. The
second feature, as evidenced in our examination of executive
compensation and Ponzi schemes above, 214 is that clawbacks
211. See, e.g., Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth
Business, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1455, 1492 n.193 (2008) (describing clawback sta-
tutes that enable a defendant who paid multiple damages in a foreign country
to recover the multiple portion of those damages from the plaintiff).
212. See, e.g., Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Mas-
ters and E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 357 (2008) (defining a claw-
back in context of discovery as an "agreement regarding a procedure for re-
trieving privileged information that has been inadvertently produced in the
course of discovery").
213. Although it is always difficult to find a citation for a negative proposi-
tion like this one, the authors did a quick survey of the contracts casebooks in
their respective offices, including: RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
DOCTRINE (3d ed. 2008); BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSHAW, CONTRACTS: CAS-
ES, DISCUSSIONS, AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 2008); and E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH ET
AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2008) and did not find chap-
ters or significant discussion of anything related to clawbacks in the books.
The authors also consulted their textbooks on business associations and corpo-
rate law and did not find the term discussed there either.
214. See supra Parts I.B-C, II.B-C.
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are generally more effective when they operate prospectively
rather than retroactively.
Accordingly, in constructing a framework within which to
analyze clawbacks, we advance below a definition that we be-
lieve not only takes account of these features, but that encom-
passes many of the term's current applications. Relying on that
definition, we then examine the nature of clawbacks, explain-
ing their function and necessity, and also why clawbacks are
more effective when employed prospectively rather than re-
troactively. We then go on to examine the implications of such
clawback provisions on other areas of contract doctrine. We
conclude this Section by discussing the relative merits and
drawbacks of bottom-up versus top-down solutions, and the role
of government in mandating prospective clawbacks in certain
situations.
A. A PROPOSED DEFINITION
To lay a foundation for the doctrine, we propose that a
clawback be defined as a right to, or action for, the restitution
of unfair enrichment that is otherwise justified or permitted
under prevailing applicable law. As used here, the term "unfair
enrichment" shares certain features with, but also appears to
vary in other respects from, the traditional concept of unjust
enrichment. The traditional concept of unjust enrichment fo-
cuses on disgorgement from the breaching party.215 In the
words of one leading commentator, the underlying premise of
unjust enrichment is that "gains produced through another's
loss are unjust and should be restored."216
Unfair enrichment, like unjust enrichment, can apply to
those situations where the person unfairly enriched is not re-
sponsible for the underlying wrongdoing or event leading to the
unfair enrichment. For example, the innocent winning investor
in a Ponzi scheme who is not responsible for the fraud is never-
theless subject to the clawback of fraudulent conveyance
laws.21 7 To take an example from the executive compensation
context, an AIG executive who did not directly work on mort-
gage-backed securities or credit default swaps but received a
215. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS 599-605 (4th ed. 1998).
216. John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1409, 1409 (1974).
217. See supra Part II.A.
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bonus would still have to surrender ninety percent of the bonus
if the pending bill passes. 218
Unfair enrichment also, however, extends to those situa-
tions where the enrichment cannot readily be said to be unjust
(per unjust enrichment principles) insofar as the person unfair-
ly enriched has a preexisting legal right to payment. 219 In es-
sence, clawbacks target certain inequities that are not wholly
legally cognizable because they are in tension with independent
legal rights that have already justified or allowed for such in-
equities to exist in the first place. And thus, while it is unfair
that the losing investor in a Ponzi scheme will suffer a compa-
ratively greater loss than the winning investor when both are
equally blameless, recognizing that inequity is in tension with
the fact that the winning investor has a contractual right to the
payments received as well as a restitutionary claim for the
principal investment. 220 Similarly, it seems unfair that an ex-
ecutive at AIG could walk away with a bonus when the compa-
ny he had a responsibility to assist is failing. Nonetheless, un-
der existing law, making an equitable claim under these
circumstances is problematic as it must tackle the executive's
original contractual claim to the bonus. 221
It may be that, as sketched out above, unfair enrichment
could be regarded as a variant, albeit an unfamiliar one, of un-
just enrichment.222 Regardless, we think it is useful here to de-
218. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
219. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 1 cmt. b (Discussion Draft 2000) ("Unjustified enrichment is enrichment that
lacks an adequate legal basis: it results from a transfer that the law treats as
ineffective to work a conclusive alteration in ownership rights.").
220. See supra Part II.A.
221. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
222. One might argue, for instance, that unfair enrichment is consistent
with unjust enrichment as interpreted by Warren Seavey and Austin Scott,
the reporters of the Restatement (first) of Restitution. They cautioned that res-
titution law responds only imperfectly to the basic premise of unjust enrich-
ment and that situations in which "it is not possible to be just to one without
being unjust to the other" prevent the perfect embodiment of "the fundamental
conception of restitution" into rule form. Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott,
Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 35-37 (1938); see also LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY
& GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 13 (Gareth Jones ed., 6th ed.
2007) (noting that unjust enrichment is a "principle of justice which the law
recognizes and gives effect to in a wide variety of claims"). Alternatively, one
might paint broader strokes by postulating, as Peter Linzer does, that the pre-
vention of "unjust impoverishment" should serve as a source for applying
"rough justice" in individual cases when normally sound rules of promissory
estoppel and unjust enrichment produce unsatisfactory results. Peter Linzer,
Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts,
2009] 413
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
signate the concept separately to delineate those features of
clawbacks that not only identify them but also explain their na-
ture.
B. THE NATURE OF CLAWBACKS
As defined above, a clawback addresses inequities that
cannot easily be resolved by existing remedies under the law
because of countervailing legal rights independently supporting
such inequities. 223 Accordingly, absent the clawback, the unfair
enrichment will stand. Although the lack of legal remedies or-
dinarily connotes the absence of a cognizable legal wrong, such
a conclusion does not sit well in situations involving unfair
enrichment, and appears to be out of step with prevailing no-
tions of fairness. To the extent we think that these particular
notions of fairness should be honored-that these are inequita-
ble situations that need to be redressed notwithstanding the
countervailing legal rights involved-we would have to look to
clawbacks to override such countervailing rights so as to allow
for restitution of the unfair enrichment.
For example, although an individual AIG executive may be
blameless and have otherwise valid contractual rights to a bo-
nus, payment of the bonus is unfair because bonuses should not
be decoupled from a company's performance, particularly where
taxpayer money is involved. We thus have to turn to a retroac-
tive clawback to override the contractual rights in this situa-
tion in order to prevent unfair enrichment of the executive.
Thus, clawbacks function to bridge the gap in remedies
under prevailing law for addressing unfair enrichment, or per-
haps more accurately, they function to manage a claim of right
preventing the restitution of an unfairly conferred benefit. Ana-
lyzed in these terms, we can now explain why prospective claw-
backs are generally more effective than retroactive clawbacks.
Prospective clawbacks are those clawbacks that are introduced
before the claim of right to the benefit or enrichment has ari-
sen. 2 2 4 For instance, some companies, like Dell, are prospective-
ly writing provisions into their executive compensation con-
2001 Wis. L. REV. 695, 764. Contra HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
RESTITUTION 13 (2004) (stating that Linzer's position "is indefensible be-
cause . . . '[t]here is nothing both unique to restitution and common to all sub-
jects of restitution that justifies a greater disregard of rules than judges would
countenance in other areas of law"') (citation omitted).
223. See supra Part III.A.
224. See supra Part I.C.1.
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tracts that would recover or cancel bonus awards in the event
of restatement of financial results.225 In contrast, retroactive
clawbacks are those clawbacks that, similar to the proposed ni-
nety percent tax on bonuses, are imposed after the contractual
right to the bonuses has arisen and the benefits have been con-
ferred. 226
Our earlier examination of clawbacks in the context of ex-
ecutive compensation and Ponzi schemes indicated that the use
of prospective clawbacks-clawbacks written directly into the
original contract-was preferable to and more effective than
the use of retroactive clawbacks-statutory provisions that re-
troactively tax a bonus, for example, or fraudulent conveyance
laws. 2 2 7 The reason for this conclusion lies in the different ways
these two approaches manage legal impediments that would
otherwise prevent the restitution of unfair enrichment.
As defined above, clawbacks address unfair enrichment
that is otherwise justified or permitted under prevailing appli-
cable law. Since such prevailing applicable law justifies or al-
lows for the inequity at issue, any efforts to cure the inequity
retroactively have to confront the particular legal rights that
make the inequity possible. By contrast, prospective efforts to
prevent the inequity avoid such legal confrontations to the ex-
tent that they remove or modify the nature of the rights at is-
sue from their inception. In this way, there is little or no legal
impediment that would prevent the restitution of any unfair
enrichment.
For example, in the context of Ponzi schemes, while the re-
troactive clawback of fraudulent conveyance laws is in tension
with the winning investor's contractual and restitutionary
claims, 228 such tension is not present when employing prospec-
tive contractual clawbacks. If there is a prospective clawback
provision in the original contract, the winning investor no long-
er has those contractual and restitutionary claims under speci-
fied "unfair enrichment" circumstances as established by the
clawback provision in the investor agreement. 229 Likewise, al-
though we could try to implement retroactive clawbacks like
225. See infra Appendix, Part C.1-3 (providing examples of various claw-
back provisions in executive compensation contracts triggered by a material
restatement of financial results).
226. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part II.A.
228. See id.
229. See supra Part II.C.
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the pending tax bill to attempt to recover bonus payments
made to AIG executives, such attempts are problematic because
they must contend with existing contractual rights to such bo-
nuses, not to mention the concomitant constitutional rights in-
volved.230 Introducing prospective clawbacks, however, will
mean that such contractual rights are modified automatically
under the specified circumstances of unfair enrichment to allow
for the recovery of the unfair restitution as represented by the
bonuses. 231
Thus, the very nature of clawbacks indicates that prospec-
tive rather than retroactive clawbacks will generally prove to
be the more effective tool for addressing the unfair enrichment
at issue. So far, this Section has concentrated on defining the
term "clawback" and argued that prospective clawbacks will be
a far more effective way of addressing the various unfair
enrichment concerns that arise in executive compensation and
Ponzi schemes. We turn in the next Section to a slightly differ-
ent question-what impact would clawback provisions have on
other concepts within contract law doctrine?
C. IMPLICATIONS OF CLAWBACKS FOR CONTRACT DOCTRINE
1. Reconciling the Doctrine
Clawback provisions could be categorized in varying ways
within existing contract doctrine. One such doctrinal home for
clawbacks would be the realm of conditions. According to the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, a condition only refers to a
contract that already exists. 232 Further, the Restatement limits
a condition to an event that must occur before a duty of perfor-
mance arises. 233 A prior common law tradition did recognize,
however, "an event that extinguishes a duty that has already
arisen," in the form of a "condition subsequent."234 While the
Restatement has eliminated conditions subsequent and refers
only to "conditions," this terminology and the analytical frame-
230. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part I.C.
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 cmt. c (1979) ("In order
for an event to be a condition, it must qualify a duty under an existing con-
tract.").
233. Id. § 224 ("A condition is an event not certain to occur ... before per-
formance under a contract becomes due.").
234. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 523-25 (3d ed. 1999).
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work on which it is based may be useful for our present purpos-
es. 235
To illustrate how a clawback provision could be categorized
as a condition subsequent, consider an example from the execu-
tive compensation context. A contract between the corporation
and the executives might provide a certain level of bonus. The
obligation to pay out the bonus would be conditioned on the
company's stock price reaching a particular level. Reaching
that performance goal would therefore be a condition precedent
to payment of the bonus. Once that performance goal has been
reached, a legal obligation to pay the bonus attaches. However,
let us also assume that the original contract additionally in-
cluded a clawback provision that is triggered in the event that
the financial benchmarks were later found to have been
reached through fraudulent accounting, in the form of a ma-
terial restatement of financial results. 236 Such a clawback pro-
vision would then operate as a condition subsequent. Even
though the legal duty to pay the bonus had technically arisen
when the stock price was reached, it would be extinguished by
the "triggering" of the clawback (i.e., the restatement of finan-
cial results).
Another way to think about the role of clawback provisions
within contract doctrine would be to see them as a form of sti-
pulated damages. Parties may agree in advance to an amount
of money payable in the event of breach of contract. In essence,
this allows the parties to rewrite the default rules for contract
damages by prior agreement. 237 An important limitation on sti-
pulated damages, however, is that they cannot be so large that
they have an "in terrorem effect," lest they be classified as a pe-
nalty. 23 8 If a clause is "condemned as a penalty," a court will
hold that the provision is unenforceable. 239
One way this view of clawbacks as stipulated damages
might play out can be illustrated by the example of a contrac-
tual clawback provision that is triggered in the event of execu-
235. Id. at 523.
236. See, e.g., infra Appendix (categorizing various clawback provisions in
executive compensation contracts based on triggering events, one of which
might be material restatement of financial results).
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1979) ("Damages
for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an
amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by
the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss.").
238. FARNSWORTH, supra note 234, at 841.
239. Id. at 843.
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tive misconduct.240 Let us assume in this instance that perfor-
mance benchmarks are met, and the bonus is paid. Unfortu-
nately, in prior weeks, the executive had gambled millions of
dollars in company money away in Las Vegas-a result that
would doubtless be deemed "misconduct." At that point, the
misconduct creates a breach and requires activation of the
clawback provision to recover the bonus that had been paid. In
this example, the stipulated damages amount is the amount of
the bonus.241 If this result is too harsh or draconian, it may be
challenged and held unenforceable in the same way that a pe-
nalty clause might be challenged and invalidated under the
standard doctrinal dichotomy of liquidated damages versus pe-
nalties. 242
Ultimately, clawback provisions could have an effect on
many of the other significant doctrinal areas that concern the
allocation of risk within contracts. Some of the more salient
areas that might be affected would be conditions more general-
ly, as well as defenses-including mistake, 243 impracticabili-
ty,24 4 and frustration of purpose 245-the application of which
would all depend on notions of allocation of risk.
2. Relational Contract Theory and Executive Compensation
Clawback provisions may also impact contract doctrine on
a more theoretical level. Such provisions in the context of ex-
ecutive compensation lend support to relational contract theory
as opposed to the classical model of contracting. The classical
model views the behavior of contracting as involving a series of
discrete contracts between rational actors in a competitive
marketplace who employ contracts as a way to allocate risks.246
240. See, e.g., infra Appendix, Part B.1-2 (describing clawback provisions
in executive compensation contracts based on the triggering event of executive
fraud or misconduct).
241. Of course, one could argue that the company could turn around and
sue its agent for fraud-and if the company was unwilling to do so, a share-
holder could bring a derivative action to force the company to act. Bringing a
claim of fraud, however, which requires pleading with particularity, is more
difficult than a straight contract claim. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(a) ("In alleging
fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances con-
stituting fraud or mistake.").
242. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 234, at 843.
243. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151-158 (1979).
244. See id. §§ 261-272.
245. See id.
246. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There I No Law of Relational
Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (2000) (stating that classical contract
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Under this model, the contract may specify which party bears
the risk of the occurrence (or nonoccurrence) of particular
events, and sophisticated parties bargain in order to place a
risk upon that party that is the least-cost avoider. 247
In contrast, relational contract theory, as described by Pro-
fessors Ian Macneil 248 and Stewart Macaulay, 249 seeks to put
the contracting parties' interactions into a larger social context.
Instead of seeing contracts as one-off discrete transactions, re-
lational theory describes patterns of reciprocal behavior, often
over a period of years, between repeat players. 250
Clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts,
through their very structure, rule out the possibility of a short-
term relationship. Because certain events that could occur in
the future may trigger the reclamation of the benefit conferred,
a contract with a clawback provision cannot be a one-off trans-
action. A contract with a prospective clawback term thus serves
to link the parties to each other and incentivizes executives to
perform over longer periods of time.
From these questions of contract doctrine, we turn now to a
final question, which is how these prospective clawback meas-
ures might be implemented. In addressing this question, the
following Section considers whether their adoption will be
wholly voluntary or alternatively achieved with the assistance
of the legislature, administrative agencies, or courts.
D. BOTTOM-UP OR TOP-DOWN APPROACHES TO CLAWBACKS?
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, renewed calls for
theory was based on "a paradigm of bargains made between strangers trans-
acting on a perfect market" and "a rational-actor model of psychology").
247. For a thorough treatment of the classical model of contract, as well as
other theoretical perspectives on contracts, see Kojo Yelpaala, Legal Con-
sciousness and Contractual Obligations, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 193, 209-13
(2008).
248. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and
Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 881 (2000); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Con-
tract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, 484.
249. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of
Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian MacNeil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 Nw.
U. L. REV. 775, 792-93 (2000).
250. Cf. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 779-89
(9th Cir. 1981) (finding "course of trade" important in the evaluation of a long-
term contractual relationship between parties who acted as functional part-
ners); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 6-9 (4th Cir. 1971)
(finding "course of dealing" important in the evaluation of contract terms
where Royster had once been a purchaser and then became a seller).
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government regulation have already ensued. Professor Joseph
Grundfest analogizes the reactive pattern of lawmaking in the
securities area to the evolutionary biology theory of punctuated
equilibrium.251 In evolutionary biology, sudden and drastic
changes take place in response to "dramatic and identifiable
events."25 2 Grundfest likens the Great Depression and the
Enron failure to extreme events that forced securities law to
evolve at a rapid pace. 2 53 In the case of the Great Depression,
the regulatory response to the stock market crash created our
system of public reporting and disclosure.254 And in response to
several massive accounting frauds at Enron and WorldCom,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, separating "federal
securities law from state corporate law" and creating "an en-
tirely new structure for the governance of the accounting pro-
fession."255
Certainly, the financial crisis of the fall of 2008 is of such
magnitude that one wonders whether a top-down regulatory so-
lution is needed in order to prevent the vicissitudes of the fi-
nancial cycle-both those gyrations that are irrationally exub-
erant as well as the inevitable troughs. At the same time, we
should not fall into the trap of only regulating in response to
scandal. 256 Solutions and policies should be contemplated and
analyzed before problems arise. Analysts have not had time yet
to react to the financial crisis-or to think through fully any of
its root causes. For now, it is enough to say that we tend to be
in more of a reactive position in responding to financial crises
generally, 257 not only in the current situation.
One alternative that we have discussed throughout this
Article is to write clawback provisions directly into contracts on
a prospective basis. Attorneys for investors have been trying to
251. See Joseph Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of Unit-
ed States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1-2 (2002).
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 1.
255. Id. at 2.
256. See Rosen, supra note 50, at 2940 ("Corporate scandals may indicate a
need for reform, but poor, ill-considered reform can easily lead to further fru-
stration for the scandals' victims.").
257. See, e.g., President-Elect Obama Announces Mary Schapiro as Head of
Securities and Exchange Commission, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/12/18/AR2008121802394_pf
.html (reporting President Obama's statement that "what will be just as im-
portant to our long-term economic stability is a 21st-century regulatory
framework to ensure that a crisis like this can never happen again").
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cobble together these types of clawback remedies retroactively
based on equitable principles. 258 Obviously, it would be easier
for attorneys to implement these types of remedies if they were
clearly written prospectively into investment contracts, in the
context of hedge funds, or into employment contracts, in the
context of corporate management. This is more of a bottom-up
approach to reform,259 with incremental changes in individual
contracts, which then generate a body of law surrounding claw-
back provisions, their substance, their interpretation, and their
enforcement.
In contract law, specialized clauses like the clawback pro-
visions we discuss here serve important functions. The more a
particular clause is used, the more likely it is to be included in
standard boilerplate, and to have a body of doctrine and partic-
ular modes of related judicial interpretation.260 One example
would be the humble (yet heroic) force majeure clause, which
allocates risk between the parties upon the instance of a cata-
strophic event. 261 Major casebooks include a discussion of force
majeure clauses, normally as part of their discussion of frustra-
tion of purpose or commercial impracticability. 262 Other exam-
ples of such specialized provisions include merger and integra-
tion clauses (normally included in discussion of the parol
evidence rule),263 indemnification clauses, 264 and provisions re-
258. See supra Part III.B.
259. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down
Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 933 (2006) ("Democratic legal systems
make law in one of two ways: by abstracting general principles from the deci-
sions made in individual cases (from the bottom up); or by declaring general
principles through a centralized authority that are to be applied in individual
cases (from the top down)."); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 891 (2006) (observing the difference between case-based
and non-case-based rulemakers).
260. See Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boiler-
plate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1078 (2006) (observing how contract terms "be-
come boilerplate either because they are widely copied or because they are
used repeatedly by the drafter or its client").
261. See, e.g., Phillips P.R. Core, Inc. v. Tradax Petroleum Ltd., 782 F.2d
314, 319-20 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he basic purpose of force majeure clauses ... is
... to relieve a party from its contractual duties when its performance has
been prevented by a force beyond its control or when the purpose of the con-
tract has been frustrated.").
262. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 234, at 642-44.
263. See, e.g., id. at 436.
264. See, e.g., id. at 373.
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lating to warranties. 265 In all of these instances, the clauses ac-
quire particular meanings as they become more commonplace
and routine.
It may be that investors will begin demanding clawback
protections independent of any regulation. On the other hand,
we have seen all too frequently the principal-agent problem
manifesting itself in the corporate context.266 The gap between
the shareholders and the board of directors can, all too often,
result in a lack of accountability for the board and the manag-
ers of the publicly traded company. 267 Between the public out-
cry over executive bonuses, and the motivation this proxy sea-
son to write clawbacks into executive compensation contracts
going forward, it is entirely possible that there will be sufficient
momentum present to solve the problem.
It is also possible that legislative or administrative action
by the SEC is required in order to ensure the inclusion of claw-
backs in executive compensation arrangements. This is not an
unusual proposal; there are many laws (securities-related and
otherwise) that mandate particular disclosures, or specific con-
tractual language. For example, mandatory disclosures are re-
quired in certain real estate transactions.268 But one need not
even stray that far from the corporate context in order to find
such examples of mandatory disclosures. For example, con-
tracts for the sale of stock in a private placement must disclose
particular limitations on the resale of the securities. 269 At this
point, these provisions are well-accepted, and indeed expected.
With so many disclosures already part of the landscape of con-
tract in the securities arena, mandating an additional set of
prospective contract terms concerning clawback provisions is
eminently achievable.
265. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (2000) (addressing the creation of express
warranties in the sale of goods as governed under the Uniform Commercial
Code).
266. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 15-17 (discussing the emer-
gence of the agency problem in the corporate context).
267. See id.
268. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 78.08(b)(3) (David A. Thomas ed.,
2d ed. 1999) (describing a California law that mandates disclosures in real
property as to the condition of the land, the location of adjacent airports, and
any provisions for public utilities).
269. See SEC Private Resales of Securities to Institutions Rule, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144A (2009).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has described, in detail, the use of contractual
clawbacks in two different scenarios-executive compensation
and Ponzi schemes. In both of these situations, we have ana-
lyzed the gap in the remedies currently available and remarked
that the gap leads to a continuing problem of unfair enrich-
ment. As we have described, writing clawbacks prospectively
and directly into contracts can provide a ready avenue for re-
covery. In the context of executive compensation, prospective
clawbacks force executives to align their interests with that of
the long-term growth of the company. In the context of Ponzi
schemes, such clawbacks present an opportunity to equalize the
final position of winning and losing investors. In tandem, these
remedies provide an important way of prospectively changing
the legal landscape to further the protection of shareholders
and investors.
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APPENDIX: CATEGORIES OF CLAWBACKS IN
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CONTRACTS
The following is a categorization of clawback provisions re-
garding executive compensation, which are triggered in the
event of employee bad faith, misconduct or fraud, or a restate-
ment of financial results. These exemplars of clawbacks have
been culled from the filings of publicly traded companies. Com-
pensation arrangements are typically disclosed in a company's
Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CDA), a portion of the
company's definitive proxy statement (Form 14A-DEF), as filed
with the SEC. While the content of a clawback may vary widely
with the language of any particular contract, these categories
seem to reflect the most common triggering events for recoup-
ment. The first category, bad faith, would likely be ineffectual,
while the last category, which would allow for a clawback in the
event of a material financial restatement, would probably have
the most impact.
A. BAD FAITH CONDUCT
1. McKesson Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF
14A), at 32 (June 23, 2008).
Clawback Policy. As described in the Company's stan-
dard award documentation, the Compensation Com-
mittee may seek to recoup any economic gains from
equity grants from any employee who engages in con-
duct which is not in good faith and which disrupts,
damages, impairs or interferes with the business, rep-
utation or employees of the Company or its affiliates.
2. Ford Motor Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF
14A), at 71-72 (April 4, 2008).
The Plan has certain conditions which must be met
prior to the distribution of any award in order for a
participant to receive an award following termination
of employment. These conditions include continuing
employment with the Company or a subsidiary or, if
termination was for a reason other than death, being
available to consult and supply information to the
Company. In addition, the participant must refrain
from competitive activity, unless the Company ap-
proves the activity. A participant also may forfeit an
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award, including deferred amounts, for conduct con-
trary to the best interests of the Company.
B. FRAUD OR MISCONDUCT
1. General Motors Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement
(Form DEF 14A), at 35 (April 25, 2008).
In October 2006, the GM Board adopted and an-
nounced a policy regarding the recoupment of un-
earned compensation, applicable to incentive compen-
sation paid to executive officers after January 1, 2007
and unvested portions of awards previously granted,
in situations involving financial restatement due to
employee fraud, negligence, or intentional misconduct.
In conjunction with this, the Committee charter was
modified to reflect the new policy and the revised
charter and policy were published on GM's Web site.
In addition, we added provisions to all executive in-
centive and deferred compensation plans to reference
Board policies affecting compensation, and require
that the compensation of all executives covered by this
policy be subject to this recoupment clause.
2. American Express Co., Definitive Proxy Statement
(Form DEF 14A), at 32 (March 14, 2008).
Policy Regarding Recoupment of Incentive Compensa-
tion. To protect the shareholders' interests, we have a
policy pursuant to which we will, to the extent prac-
ticable, seek to recover performance-based compensa-
tion from any executive officer and certain other
members of senior management in those circums-
tances where (i) the payment of such compensation
was based on the achievement of financial results that
were subsequently the subject of a restatement, (ii) in
the Board's view the employee engaged in fraud or
misconduct that caused or partially caused the need
for the restatement, and (iii) a smaller or no payment
would have been made to the employee based upon
the restated financial results.
Detrimental Conduct. To help protect our competitive
position, we have a "detrimental conduct" policy, cov-
ering approximately 540 executives (including the
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NEOs). Each covered executive is required to sign an
agreement that requires him or her, among other pro-
visions, to forfeit the pre-tax proceeds from some or all
of his or her compensation received under the 1998
Plan and the 2007 Plan, including RSAs (and divi-
dends paid), NQSOs, RSUs (and dividend equivalents
paid), PGs awarded under either plan and, in the case
of executive officers, all of his or her AIAs that were
received up to two years prior to employment termina-
tion if he or she engages in conduct that is detrimental
to the Company following employment termination.
Detrimental conduct includes, for example, working
for certain competitors, soliciting our customers or
employees, or disclosing our confidential information.
The detrimental conduct policy is in addition to the
obligations arising under our Code of Conduct.
C. RESTATEMENT OF FINANCIAL RESULTS
1. Cisco Systems, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF
14A), at 28 (September 25, 2008).
Following the Compensation Committee's recommen-
dation in March 2008, the Board of Directors adopted
a recoupment policy for cash incentive awards paid to
executive officers under Cisco's annual cash incentive
plan, the EIP. In the event that there were a restate-
ment of incorrect financial results, this policy would
enable the Compensation Committee, if it determined
appropriate and subject to applicable laws, to seek
reimbursement of the incremental portion of EIP
awards paid to executive officers in excess of the
awards that would have been paid based on the res-
tated financial results. Cisco's variable cash incentive
and long-term, equity-based incentive award plans al-
so generally provide for forfeiture if a named executive
officer participates in activities detrimental to Cisco or
is terminated for misconduct. Additionally, consistent
with statutory requirements, including the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, and the principles of responsible
oversight, and depending upon the specific facts and
circumstances of each situation, the Compensation
Committee would review all performance-based com-
pensation where a restatement of financial results for
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a prior performance period could affect the factors de-
termining payment of an incentive award.
2. Dell Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at
71-72 (June 2, 2008).
Recoupment Policy for Performance Based Compensa-
tion. If Dell restates its reported financial results, the
Board of Directors will review the bonus and other
awards made to the executive officers based on finan-
cial results during the period subject to the restate-
ment, and to the extent practicable, Dell will recover
or cancel any such awards based on having met or ex-
ceeded performance targets that would not have been
met under the restated financial results.
3. Exxon Mobile Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement
(Form DEF 14A), at 32 (April 10, 2008).
Should the Corporation's reported financial or operat-
ing results be subject to a material negative restate-
ment within five years, the Board would seek to ob-
tain from each executive officer an amount
corresponding to any incentive award or portion the-
reof that the Board determines would not have been
granted or paid had the Corporation's results as origi-
nally reported been equal to the Corporation's results
as subsequently restated.
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